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EXECUTI°JE SUNU4ARY
Introduction
This paper analyses problems of labor market adjustnents to occupational
safety and health (OSH) hazards .It also presents analytical models for the
eventual measurement and empirical analysis of factors affecting the level of
OSH hazards in the workplace . This study does not pretend to deal with the
regulatory problem in operational terms . It nevertheless raises conceptual
issues that may be relevant for regulatory strategy .
Section I contains a statement of the problem and an outline of the
analysis .
Occupational Safetv and Health : Appropriate Levels
Section II discusses the concept of appropriate levels of OSH . Tradeoffs
of OSH policies with other objectives , such as employment and wage levels,
are formalized . We also discuss tradeoffs with other government programs,
and distributional and efficiency aspects of OSH .
A definition of cost-efficiency of OSH policies is proposed , taking into
account the risk and imperfect information aspects of OSH . This is analysed in
terms of allocations of OSH expenditures across standards , classes of workers
and activities .
The Role of the Market
Section III studies the role of the market : wage differentials that com-
pensate for OSH hazards ; some characteristics of market allocations of wages
and safety such as efficiency and distribution .
From a public policy point of view Section III reviews conditions
under which market forces could bring about an adequate level of OSH , and
under what conditions it is necessary to have a government policy that would
increase the level of information on occupationally related OSH hazards . It
also studies the behavior of markets for risk spreading , such as insurance
markets for post-injury compensation by firms .
Market Imperfections
Section IV studies market imperfections-market adjustments with imperfect
information about OSH and about firms' actions regarding OSH ; the quasi public
good aspects of OSH ; institutional rigidities such as lack of perfect mobility
of workers ; OSH externalities such as spillover effects of OSH on the families
of workers , the community near the workplace
	
and society as a whole ; and
also externalities in the produciton of OSH and of OSH information . The discount
factors of firms (or managers) about future OSH costs , and collective incentives
of firms to decrease OSH levels with asymmetric information are discussed also .
The Role of the Government
Section V studies the role of the government ; its objectives and instru-
ments of OSH policies . In addition to conditions under which it is a legitimate
government function to provide health and safety information beyond that
normally available in labor markets (including information about firms' actions
about OSH) we explore conditions under which it is a desirable governemnt poli-
cy to set standards and fires for noncompliance with the standards , and/or
incentives (e .g .taxation , workmen's compensation) and provision of info-
rmation to bring OSH to socially optimal levels . The relative efficiency and
desirability of incentives and standards ( and combinations of both) is analysed :
for very irreversible costly and uncertain events standards are preferable
to taxes while for more reversible, less costly and uncertain events taxation
may be preferable . Of particular importance are distributional questions
underlying different policies .
The informational role of the government is seen to be complementary
rather than a substitute to the roles of providing incentives and setting
standards . This informational role includes the producti-)n of OSH information
(or incentives for private production ) and the(facilitation of) gathering
and dissemination of information to workers, firms, labor unions , and
insurance companies (including information about firms' OSH actions) .
The Role of Labor Unions
Section VI discusses the role of labor unions . It analyses reasons why
it has been historically the case that labor unions did not put more emphasis
on OSH,to detect possible government role in facilitating union's actions
regarding OSH . More recently thetrend is towards OSH being an element of
contract bargaining : policy implications are analysed in this light . The role
of government in obtaining OSH improvement for non-unionized workers is
discussed .
Conclusions
The results suggest that there is no standard 'correct policy' for OSH
but a variety of policies are required . In the concluding remarks it is
proposed that a classification of OSH cases and corresponding adequate
policies is an important component of a cost-efficient
	
policy for the
attainment of socially optimal levels of OSH . The classification should
involve factors such as size of the firm, mobility of workers, degree of
unionization, level of unemployment, the effect of illness and death on
the family of the worker , 'spillover effects' on the population as a whole
through income security and medical procramms, degree of uncertainty or
lack of information , and social risk aversion (i .e . the decree to which it
'cannot be afforded' to be even slightly off the mark) .
I . INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
At present there seems to be both more awareness of occupational
safety and hazards and also a higher rate of introduction of new
ones .
The introduction of new potent chemical agents and in general new
technologies which are largely untested for adverse safety and health
effects both at the working places and their surrounding communities has
increased in the last two or three decades . l The health effects include
also cases with long 'latent periods' which may affect the future health
of the population in unknown wavs . 2
The working place is particularly vulnerable because of the higher
level of concentration of chemicals, and otherwise exposure experienced
there . 3
	
In some cases, workers appear to have the role of experimenting,
. for society as a whole, the risks associated with the introduction of new
lSource : Testimony of Samuel S . Enstein, M .D ., Case Western Reserve University
Medical School . Hearings before the Selected Subccmrmittee on Labor of the
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 1975 [6 j .
2Sometimes the latent periods are of twenty to thirty five years, as in the
case of vinyl chloride . OSHA has recently promulgated standards that
permit almost no employee exposure at all .
3The list of chemicals that threaten occupational health is long . NIOSH has
listed over 12,000 toxic materials, The Toxic Substance List , 1973 Ed ., HEW
[37] . Among cancer-linked substances are : chromates, used in paints, which
pose a hazard of lung cancer . Rubber workers have an increased risk of
leukemia from exposure to benzene ._ Lung cancer and lymphoma occur at
high rate among workers exposed to inorganic arsenic which is a basic
material in more than 40 jobs from tinting windshields to spraying
flowers . Arsenic, _likevinyl chloride, has also been Inked to liver
cancer . Benzidine (use in dye making) has been known for 60 years to
produce bladder cancer ; it has been withdrawn in Great Britain, U .S .S .R.
and other countries but it is still widely used in the U .S . Sources :_ U .S .
Department of Health, Education ana welfare and the American Cancer Society .
a
chemicals or techniques4 that maybe, in the longer run, of benefit to all .
Several decades ago the preva-Ding view was the 'assumption of risk'
doctrine accepted by the legal institutions . In economic terms, it
derives from viewing
	
labor markets as perfectly competitive : workers
choose to undergo risks inherent in certain jobs because of the wage
differentials (wage premiums) that compensate for them, and these choices are ma_
in an optimal way . A more recent view, expressed in the Occupational
Safety and Health (OSH) Act passed by Congress in 1970, holds that the
government ought "to assure as far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions" . Implicit in
this mandate of OSHA is a concern about the possible imperfections in the
labor markets adjustments to health and safety hazards as well as distri-
butional questions . Possible imperfections in labor markets have been
mentioned in this .context : lack of information, and, in general,
uncertainty, about risks and dangers, lack of perfect mobility of
workers and other institutional rigidities, externalities both in the
production of OSH and of information about OSH risks and dangers . 5
In addition to the above there are other sources of concern that
require closer examination : One is the problem of persistent high
unemployment rates, coupled with lower rates of economic growth of the
last few years, and expected for the near future . There is an under-
standing that labor market choices by workers are constrained in high
4 Occupational (OSHA) standards are also not as rigorous as the standards of
other regulatory agencies that regulate exposure to the same hazards by the
population in general . For instance, for lead (ug/m3 ) OSHA standards are
550 ; EPA's (Environmental Protection Agency) are 30 day/mean 1 .5 . For N02
(ppm) OSHA standards are 5 ; for EPA annual mean is 0 .50 . For S02 (ppm)
OSHA standards are 5 ; EPA's annual mean 0 .03 . See Cornell, Noll and
Weingart 119 ] .
5See, for instance, Cornell, Noll and Weingart (19 J, Smith (52 ], Settle
and Weisbrod [53 1 , Zekchauser and Nichols 172 1 .
-3-
unemployment situations : the choice may be between a risky or unhealthy
job or no job at a11 6 . This persistence of high unemployment is viewed
sometimes as imperfect market behavior ; as such it lends relevance to
arguments for OSH regulation . On the other side, because growth rates
and increases in productivity are related to industrial technical in-
novation and sometimes to investment on more risky enterprises (such as
nuclear power plants) more stringent OSH regulations may in some cases com-
pound the lower growth-unemployment problem .
	
This latter effect is one
instance in which OSH (and also environmental) regulating activities
by the government are seen by some as misdirected paternalism . Impacts
of OSHA's actions are also sometimes studied in terms of their effects
on inflation and employment . $
A second source of concern about OSH relates to the environmental and
public health effects for the population as a whole . For instance it is
increasingly difficult in many instances to isolate the effects of toxic
chemicals . Of considerable concern among the experts is the risk that
hazardous substances pose for people living near plants or for families
of workers . The bill for lack of OSH is increasingly being paid by
6The Council for the Society for the Plastic Industry, William D . Ruckelshaus
(and former Environmental Protection Administrator) stated : 'A man (or
woman) may prefer to risk cancer in 20 years rather than not to have a job'
Boston Globe, 12/3/75 .
7See, for instance, the Inflationary Impact Statements of OSHA E 65 ) , ( 66 ] .
8Epidemiologists in South Africa and England have found mesothlioma in a
number of men and women who had never inside an asbestos plant, including
a few who had simply lived in the households of asbestos workers . In the
U .S . people living in communities where there are copper-smelting
facilities have a higher than expected average of lung cancer . Some
experts are beginning to uncover what seems to be community wide effects
from vinyl chloride . In three Ohio towns where vinyl chloride was used
in industry, researchers have found an unexplainable high number of deaths
from cancers of the central nervous system in the adult population as
well as neural malformations in children. Source : U .S .H .E .W . and American
Cancer Society . - .
society as a whole through several mechanisms .
	
I shall discuss these
next .
In addition to the total burden of the individuals immediately affected, 9 the
are other economic effects (externalities) on the whole family of the worker
and the derived costs to society . In an economy in which social welfare
uses a non-trivial and growinglo share of government expenditures, this can
represent in itself an important cost of OSH shared by all the taxpayers .
For instance, in the category of programs not directly based on need but
to replace a proportion of wages lost as a result of retirment, disability,
death or unemployment, are included the largest of all income transfer
programs : old-age, survivors of death of parent or spouse, and dis-
ability insurance (OASDI) . The source of funds for OASDI are federal
payroll taxes on employers and employees . In the fiscal year 1976 the
expenditures amounted to 71 .4 billions of dollars and covered a monthly
average of 32 .1 million people . In the category of aid to families with
dependent children (AFDC) are included families with children deprived
of support because of death, absence from home, or incapacity of parent .
The sources of AFDC expenditures are Federal-State-local revenues . In
the fiscal year 1976 AFDC expenditures amounted to 9 .8 billion dollars
and the beneficiaries amounted to a monthly average of 11 .4 million people . 11
While it is not precisely known the proportion of OASDI and AFDC that is
due to deaths, disability or health deterioration of working members of
9The total cost of occupational hazards in terms of lost wages, medical expenses,
insurance claims, production delays, lost time of workers, and equipment damage
was estimated by the National Safety Council at $9 .3 billion during 1971, nearlj
1% of GNP . According to Ashford [ 71 this figure grossly understates costs whit
should be more realistically twice as high as -the National Safety Council estime
1OForty years ago there were virtually no federal income security programs .
1lSee B . Chiswick and J .A. O'Neill [17], Chapter 4, Source : Council of
Economic Advisers (based on program information .)
the recipient families, the concern exists that it may be considerable . 12
Empirical work in this area would be needed to ascertain, .econcmy-wide
costs of OSH hazards .
A third source of concerns relates to medical costs . A Less healthy
population requires more medical care . U .S . health expenditures have
accelerated rapidly in the last few years and are at present more than 8%
of GNP . Public spending increased sharply and at a much higher rate than
private spending for health care . It is by now accepted that these increases in
health expenditures are in part related to increase in the demand for
health services13-
	
Thus, the social costs for a less healthhy popula-
tion can be seen to spread to larger segments of society in terms of
increased medical costs . The extent to which OH hazards affect medical
expenditures still needs to be ascertained--and further empirical work
is needed in this area . For instance, the more generalized spillover
effects on the communities near plants, or the families of workers
should also be computed as part of the economic costs of OSH hazards .
In view of the above, in addition to the usual studies on the
inflationary effects of regulation for increased OSH (because of their
tendency to increase costs to producers and perhaps decrease productivity)
the opposite effects of lack of OSH on inflation and lack of productivity
should also be taken into consideration .
12As reported by Ashford (7 l, National Safety Council estimates that 14,200
deaths and 2,300,000 disabling injuries (100,000 of which cause permanent
disability) resulted from accidents only during 1971 . Since the ratio of
serious injuries to reported ones is about 10 to 1, Ashford concludes that
the true national level of serious but not disabling injuries is nearer to
25 million per year .
13See for instance Zubkoff (73 J .
Outline of the Analysis
In this paper we analyse the problems of labor market adjustments to
occupational safety and health (OSH) hazards . This study does not pre-
tend to deal with the regulatory problem in operational terms . It never-
theless raises analytical issues that may be relevant for the eventual
measurement and empirical analysis of factors affecting the levels of
OSH as a whole, and for regulatory strategy .
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the concept of appropriate
levels of OSH, section II .
Section III studies the role of the market : wage differentials to
compensate for OSH hazards ; some characteristics of market allocations
for wages and safety such as efficiency and distribution .
From a public policy viewpoint Section III reviews the conditions
under which market forces could bring about an adequate level of safety
and health, and under what conditions it is necessary to have a government
policy that would increase the level of information on occupationally
related health and safety hazards . It also studies the behavior of
markets for risk spreading, such as insurance markets for post-injury compensati
Section IV studies market imperfections : market adjustments with
imperfect information about OSH and about firms actions regarding OSH ;
the behavior of large firms in setting OSH standards, institutional
rigidities such as lack of perfect mobility of workers, and OSH exter-
nalities, and also externalities in the production of OSH and of OSH
information .
Section V studies the role of the government objectives and instru-
ments of OSH policy . In addition to conditions under which. i t is a
legitimate government function to provide health and safety information be
yond that normally available in labor markets, we explore conditions under
which it is a sensible government policy to set standards and fines for
noncompliance with the standards, and/or taxation incentives, provision of
information or legislation to bring OSH to socially optimal levels . The
relative efficiency and desirability of taxation and standards is
studied ; for very irreversible, costly and uncertain events, standards
are preferable to taxes while for more reversible, less costly and
uncertain events, taxation may be preferable .
In Section VI we discuss the role of unions in the possible decen-
tralization of decisions about OSH .
The results suggest that there is no standard 'correct policy' for
OSH, but a variety of policies are required . In the concluding remarks
it is proposed that a classification of cases and corresponding adequate
policies is an important component of a cost-efficient attainment of
socially optimal levels of OSH . The classification should involve factors
such as size of the firm, mobility of workers, degree of unionization,
level of unemployment, the effect of illness and death on the family of the
worker, 'spillover effects' on the population as a whole, degree of un-
certainty or lack of information, and social risk aversion (i .e . the
degree to which 'it cannot be afforded' to be even slightly off the mark) .
II . OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH : APPROPRIATE LEVELS
The determination of appropriate levels of OSH is
perhaps one of the more complex questions in the OSH area .
From the economist's point of view it carries several layers of diffi-
culties .
The first one is that it contains normative questions, as expressed
for instance in the mandate of the Act of Congress that established OSHA
"to assure so far as possible . . . safe and healthful working conditions for
every working man or woman . . ."
14
	
Economists, by tradition or training, tend
to dissociate from such questions and resort to individual rather than
social decision making, with the help of well established tools of eco-
nomic theory that prove the global optimality of
individual decisions mediated by the market mechanism. The nature of this
optimality is discussed in more detail in Section III . Basically, in
this context it refers to 'Pareto optimality' of market equilibria. As we discusE
below, Pareto optimality is a concept more related to efficiency and stability
than to optimality in a social welfare or normative point of view . There-
fore, much of the content and social mandate behind the OSH Act is not
well represented by analysing individual decisions and the corresponding
allocations as mediated by markets . However, surely it should be the
preoccupation of the government to carry its functions efficiently . In
fact, efficiency is an implicit normative concern, since resources are
very needed and scarce . Therefore the study of efficient allocation of
resources is itself of fundamental importance .
14
Section 2(b) OSH Act.
Another difficulty is that markets with risks and with imperfect
information, with institutional rigidities and with externalities are
imperfect . The above list of characteristics applies very much to labor
markets when OSH is considered . Imperfect markets tend to be more
difficult to analyse in terms of optimality or efficiency
and from the policy viewpoint only second best solutions can be expected .
Another major difficulty is the choice of economic tools . A
conventional economic tool, benefit-cost analysis, generates sometimes
controversy and negative reactions in many sectors concerned with OSH .
This is because the measurement of the value of human life is, at best, arbitrary
and may not be a reliable quantifiable variable, and at worst, could be
subject to value judgments opposed to the very nature of the concerns
at stake . In any case, there is wide disagreement on issues of inter-
pretation and measurement of surveys or market studies which use a
"willingness to pay" approach to establish the shadow prices of lost
lives . Some question'whose'willingness to pay ; others, whether it
should be measured before or after the injury, etc . 15
Finally the question of appropriate OSH levels (as in the OSH Act
mandate) seems to refer implicitly to a social consensus that does not exist in
practice with respect to the tradeoffs between OSH and other social goals .
Under the circumstances, one role of ecommic analysis should be to disclose
and improve understanding of the economic problems and the options available, wh
are the costs and the tradeoffs with other goals . This way the analysis may
15 For a discussion of methods of valuing lost life or life-saving policies,
see for instance Zeckhauser [ 71] .
become a useful element in the development of a policy .
Another important role is to disclose policy instruments, study their
relative impacts and effectiveness .
For the first role, the tradeoffs and costs should be studied both at
the individual and at the social level . For the second role the policy
instrument should be thought as an aid to both individual and social action .
Tradeoffs with other Objectives
We now discuss by means o_° some examples the issue of possible
tradeoffs with other objectives in determining appropriate levels of OSH .
In the first case we examine the case of an individual worker . At
some level of information, a tradeoff may be between higher wages or
higher OSH, since in general within each skill or salary range,
premiums are paid for assuming risks . In general, this represents a
choice between less OSH risks and more consumption of all other goods .
This is represented by the w(OSH) curve in Figure 1 . This curve represents
what may occur as an outcome of the competitive market mechanism . If
for instance workers utilities depend on wages and levels of OSH on the
job, i .e . u = u(w, OSH), the w(OSH) curve could also represent an indifference
curve for the individual .
If now more information is obtained that reveals more risks, and
if the previous OS1i schedule graded the previously perceived OSH levels
for different firms in an area, a different set of tradeoffs may occur .
For each firm in the area the OSH levels perceived are now lower . If there is
sufficient mobility of workers, the curve w(OSH) may shift to the right to
(w(OSH))1
	
(see Figure 1) : for every firm the now perceived level
OSH has decreased and the workers, who can choose since they are
mobile, require a premium A .
w2 w w+& Wages/level of consumption
of goods other than OSH
Figure 1
Another set of w/OSH tradeoffs, however, may arise when more informa-
tion is gathered and standard or taxes on the firm are adjusted to
the new higher perceived levels of OSH hazards
so as to be consistent with economy-wide standards . Since employees
may lower demand for workers, because of the now higher cost per unit
of hired labor (in the same group) induced by the now higher cost of
OSH, this gives rise to (w(OSH)) 2 '
	
For the same OSH levels, wages would be
lower than before (w2 ) ( See Figure 1) . An additional longer run effort
on the firms behavior may be the shifting towards more labor saving
techniques and hence an even lower labor demand . This would occur
provided the new techniques either don't increase OSH hazards with
the lower labor utilization ratios, or else are not
known to produce higher OSH hazards . If this latter effect occurs,
the total level of uncertainty may be increased .
The fact that the w/OSH schedule has changed with more infor-
mation does not mean that the previous market outcome was inefficient .
The market does not provide premium pay for exposure to unknown hazards .
One example is the case of vinyl chloride which is now known to increase
the changes of angio sarcoma . For several decades workers were exposed
to the hazard before the information was available . The fact that
those workers exposed to vinyl chloride were not paid premiums or
otherwise compensated for the extra hazards they faced does not mean
that the market was inefficient . Until the risks became known, there
was also no government regulation . This is a case where even though
markets may be perfectly competitive, the govern-
ment role as a generator of new information or restriction of use of
substances or techniques of unknown risks may increase OSH . 16
As we can see from the above example the issue of the possible
welfare loss or gain to the individual worker cannot be ascertained in
general, especially if only a partial equilibrium analysis is studied
or when only one side of the market is considered.
	
Whether the un-
employment/decreased demand for labor effect may be strong enough that
it undoes the welfare gains of increasing information and obtaining
higher premiums,is a question that reflects the market behavior as a whole
160SHA has promulgated asbestos and vinyl chloride standards that permit
almost no employee exposure at all . The degree of compliance still
needs to be established .
More information, with the corresponding adjustment of OSH policies
for consistency, may lead to welfare as well as OSH losses . Since, if
w* is a minimum required salary for a given worker, for that worker
OSH2 < OSH* ( see figure 1 ) .
In fact, the addition of new OSH information and corresponding ad-
justment of OSH standards could reduce equilibrium levels of wages and also
employment by a firm or industry ;
	
in certain cases no equilibrium with
positive employment may exist . Furthermore, this effect may be more likely to
occur in case the firm or industry has a larger component of lower income
workers . This can be seen as follows . Assume that with previous information
the standards of OSH were such that a firm's tradeoff between wages and
average OSH levels was given by a curve w(OSH) as in Figure 1 above . The
set of w/OSH combinations given by w(OSH) correspond to a one level of
demand for labor by the firm . Assume further that the utility function of
the worker depands on leisure, wages and OSH levels, so that his or her
supply of labor function is of the form S(OSH, w) . If the tradeoff between
w and OSH is given by w(OSH), then the supply of labor function is S(OSH,
w(CSH)) . Demand for labor can similarly be represented as a function of
OSH and of wages, or their equivalent levels of SOH according to w(OSH), i .e .
D - D(OSH, w(OSH)) . A labor market equilibrium will determine the level
of OSH, by equating supply with demand :
S(OSH, w(OSH)) = D(OSH, w(OSH))
Now assume that there is new information with the corresponding adjustment
of standards, that implies another schedule of tradeoff between wages and
employment
{
-15-
D(OSH,w(OSH))
N \
	
S(OSH,w(OSH))
M
S'(OSH,w(OSH) )2
and
Figure 2
(OSH,w(OSH) 2 )
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The possibly negative slope of S'(OSH,w(OSH) 2 ) can be
derived as follows :
d/(~ OSH ( S' ) = a/ a OSH (S') + a,t, w (S') aw/aOSH
~'Aw (S') > 0
a w/a OSH e- 0
Since in the above expression the second term is negative,
because
if the slope of w(OSH) is large in absolute value,
then , as in the figure 2 above , S' will have a negative
slope .
OSH, given as in w(OSH) 2 in Figure 1 .
	
For a certain amount of labor
demanded, for each level of OSH the firm offers now lower wages : some of
the difference goes to defray costs to comply with the new (higher) stan-
dards .
Let D'(OSH, W(OSH) 2 ) and S I (OSH, w(OSH) 2 ) be the new demand and supply
for labor functions derived from the new schedule of wages and OSH, w(OSH) 2
in Figure 1 . Then, as OSH increases, the corresponding wage level w may
decrease proportionally so much (as indicated in w(OSH
2
) that, since S
is an increasing function of both m and w, S'(m, w(m)) may be a decreasing
function of OSH, see Figure 2 .
Similarly since for each OSH level the firm has now higher OSH costs
(some of these costs may be transferred to the workers in the form of lower
wages offered), D'(OSH, w(OSH) 2 ) is now the relevant demand for labor
curve, see Figure 2 . The effect of the new information (and corresponding new
standards) has been to reduce employment from N to M and change OSH levels
from ml to m2 , see Figure 2 .
In fact, if these effects are pronounced enough, no equilibrium with
positive employment level may exist . This may happen either because
the negative effect on wages of increased OSH requirements is so strong
that it reflects on a significantly negatively sloped labor supply function
(as in Figure 3-a) or else because the costs to the firm on incrased OSH
requirements are so high that it reflects in a significantly lower demand
for labor (see Figure 3-b) .
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Notice that the negative effect on employment in that firm or industry
of increased OSH requirements may be more pronounced for lower income workers .
This may happen for instance if their utility functions imply a low elasticity
of substitution between wages and OSH, so that decreases in wages and employ-
ment even if accompanied by increases in OSH significantly lower their welfare .
In some cases the above mentioned tradeoffs can be compensated . For
instance, the new information could produce higher demand for certain skills
or new equipment that compensates for the initial decrease in demand for
labor when higher standards are imposed . This is seen for instance in the
U .S . Department of Labor IIS study on proposed regulation of coke oven
emissions ( 651 discussed below .
	
The final direction of the effect on
employment varies from case to case .
A case study of proposed standards for exposure to inorganic arsenic
illustrates possible effects of standards on employment . In the case of
inorganic arsenic, the U .S . Department of Labor Inflationary Impact
Statements ( 651 and (661 estimate that up to 3,700 jobs may be lost if
the standard is imposed . In the arsenical wood preservative industry
the standard would have especially severe effects : 1,700 jobs may be lost,
roughly 30% of the production force .
The case of coke oven emissions, however, illustrates a case where
the opposite effect on employment could occur . The IIS estimates that
employment could rise by 5,000 due to a decline in productivity of
between 18 and 29%, see (651 .
In the present U .S . economy, in the aggregate these effects are
probably small . However in regions where workers are not perfectly
mobile, or there are other institutional rigidities (in wages or prices) the
employment effects could be persistent . This is a discomforting picture
because there may be some perverse effects to policies . For example, there
are two cases in which regulation is generally supported : when workers
are not mobile enough to leave dangerous jobs, or when they work at
the lowest paid jobs, the group which suffers the highest OSH
risks . 17 The arguments above show that regulation that has negative
effect on unemployment is likely to affect the less mobile workers the
hardest . Also, in the above example, it is those with the lowest
wages that may be most hurt by the effects of increased information
and regulation .
At the level of society as a whole other tradeoffs may occur . One
can consider the question of the appropriate level of OSH as an invest-
ment decision on the part of the government, whose goal is to maximize
a social welfare function . The provision of OSH information and the
administration of regulatory activities to increase OSH take resources
17 See for instance [721 "
away from other social goals . In addition if low unemployment and the
derived increased level of aggregate demand is a government goal, as we
saw above, there may be relationships between those goals independently
of budgetary considerations . Another tradeoff may exist if OSH policies
are inflationary . However, the evidence about supply induced inflation
(due to higher costs) gathered by the U .S . Department of Labor IIS (see
[65 l and (66 ]) suggest that at least in the cases studied individual
OSH standards have negligible effects on the price level as a whole, even
though their effect could be more noticeable in a particular sector . 18
Another tradeoff may exist between OSH expenditures and expenditures
in other social services, such as income security programs .
As these tradeoffs are examined, the importance of the issues of
distribution and efficiency becomes clear . Employment and inflation are
very important economic variables in many ways, not the less important
of which is their effect on distribution and welfare . To the extent that
OSH policies are addressed to improving distribution if
	
OSH policies
conflict with employment policies, the tradeoffs between them becomes
more pointed . An example is the case of OSHA's impact on job related
injuries .
18The inflationary effect estimated for the proposed inorganic arsenic
standard is a one-time rise between 10 .4 and 25% of the price of
arsenic trioxide ; the price of arsenic-based wood preservatives could
increase more than three times and increase the price of treated good
5 to 20% . The price impact of coke oven emissions may affect iron and
steel manufacturing prices up to 2 .3%, and raise total person consumption
expenditures 0 .01 to 0 .07% .
Several works have studied the impact or effectiveness of OSHA
Inspection Program on injuries .
	
Owing to the lack of data on illnesses,
most of the existing analysis of impact of OSHA is on safety, although,
probably, the more general findings apply to health as well . See for
instance the works of Walter Oi [41], John Mendeloff's recent report
to the U .S . Department of Labor [26 ], and Aldona di Pietro, of ASPER
in the U .S . Department of Labor [20] . The results are far from being
conclusive ; however, they seem to indicate that OSHA's impact on injury
rates is not very signficant . In some cases an explanation is given that
since OSHA's inspections give priority to 'non compliers', this biases
the sample towards more 'non-compliers' and has the effect of relatively
increasing incidence of injuries overall . Also, the definition of
OSHA's injuries has changed since OSHA was established and this biases
the measurement of impact as well . However, the low levels of effec-
tiveness of OSH implied by the evidence of these works may make the
tradeoffs between OSH expenditures and other government expenditures
seem more severe than they are .
In the light of the above, any discussion about tradeoffs is
incomplete without careful analysis of efficiency and distribution .
Distribution
As mentioned above, one
	
part of the current concern
for OSH has to do with distribution . It is known that if workers are
classified by the level of wages, those who suffer the highest OSH
risks are differentially those with low wage rates (72 ] . This does not
imply that there are no premiums for risk . For a number of reasons,
including differences in marketable skills, workers are paid different
wages . For each ore of these groups, more risks may command higher
wages . Low income workers may receive lower wages and also have
higher OSH hazards .
As discussed above, in certain cases more OSH may actually hurt
equity . If it implies higher government expenditures on OSH, it may
imply less income security transfers . If it produces more unemployment
it may have other maldistribution effects . Furthermore, it is sometimes
argued chat it may be inefficient to use OSH policies to attempt to bring about
redistribution of welfare . However, it is a more or less established
tradition that economists tend to overemphasize the inefficiency
inherent in any form of transfers for more equality which affect
markets . The argument is that the most (or only) efficient way to
proceed would be to redistribute initial resources and then allow the
market to proceed unhindered to decide prices, and equilibrium levels of
output and of allocations . These levels of market allocations are,
in a competitive market, Pareto optimal, i .e . any move away from such an
allocation is bound to decrease someone's welfare . The next st3p in
this argument is to show that if welfare depends on individual choices
according to individual preferences (for instance between OSH and wages)
then a deviation from Pareto optimality (market equilibrium) is bound
to leave someone more dissatisfied with the level of OSH chosen for
him or'her in the regulatory process . As stated in (72 l, "the critical
question for the equity discussion is if workers wish to make a well-
informed choice to assume a higher level of risk in return for greater
wages, and if there are no externalities, does society have the right or
the obligation to interfere with that decision . If the answer is no . . ."
However it is not necessarily true that there must be a tradeoff
between greater equity and (Pareto) efficiency as indicated above . It is known
that under certain conditions there can be Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient)
allocations which are extremely unequal . As in the present cases, certain
groups may have the higher wages and lower risks and others the lower wages
and higher risks, in a Pareto optimal way . However, there are Pareto optimal
allocations in which both the distributions are more equal than in others--
and the Pareto efficiency conditions set forth in the previous paragraph
are satisfied . Of course, the individuals
(or groups) that prefer the second allocation to any other are not in general
the same individuals (or groups) that prefer the first to any other .
This is discussed in more detail in the next section . Here it
suffices to note that there may be several Pareto optimal allocations and
that some of them are more consistent with the redistributive goals
towards equality of OSH, while having all the optimality properties
assigned to market equilibria . Furthermore, when externalities exist,
to move to a more egalitarian Pareto optimum may require to proceed
through a sequence of allocations which are not Pareto optimal . For
more details, see Section IV .
Cost-Efficient of Policies
In the previous discussions about tradeoffs with other policy ob-
jectives and about distribution, the importance of the efficiency of OSH
policies was underlined . In the case of the tradeoffs with other policies,
for instance, it was seen that lack of efficiency may make tradeoffs
seem more serious than they are .
	
Similarly, lack of efficiency could make
redistributive costs seem very high . This, in turn, could bias public
opinion against OSH policies . Because of the present antiregulatory mood
in the U .S ., this makes efficiency a more important factor yet .
One definition of efficiency results from considering the question
of allocation of resources to improve OSH as ore of optimal allocations
under uncertainty, the uncertainty derived from imperfect information
about OSH and about the associated health and other economic
costs mentioned above . We describe this next, leaving the more tech-
nical aspects for subsequent chapters . For a discussion of related
theoretical issues of optimal allocation under uncertainty, see for
instance Arrow [ 2 l , [ 3 ] .
Suppose there are s states of nature representing degrees of
health (including death) in the different occupations . In the s-state a total
amount Rsc of medical and other economic) resources available to Sector c (c=1 . . .
is given . Assume that each individual acts on the basis of subjec-
tive probabilities as to the staffs of nature (which may differ - from the
real ones because of lack of information) . Let p be the subjectivei" s
probability of state s according to the i-th individual, where i = 1, . . .,I .
Let xisc be the expenditures allocated to individual i if state s occurs
(e .g . workmen's compensation, income security, health care costs) . These
expenditures are limited by available resources (for instance government
resources from taxation? so that-
X .
	
< x
i=1 lsc - sc
A first problem of optimal allocation of risk bearing is that of choosing
the allocation of resources x,
isc
subject to the constraint (1)
so that no other choice will make every individual better off
according to his/her preferences .
There are other ways to attempt to achieve optimal allocation of
risk bearing . One is to change the probabilities p is (the probability
of state s to occur) . This can be done in several ways .
One is , by regulation that decreases the probabilities of some events, and
increases the probabilities of others) ; this policy has its own costs
which should be included in the budget constraint (1) as follows :
L
(2) E xisc ~ xsc - c(pis)
i=1
where c(p,
is
) is the cost of changing probability of state s
Another way could be to improve the individual's
perception of this probability ; this second change is of the nature of
producing and distributing new information .
Note that in all this x
sc
are fixed (e .g . government) budgets .
Therefore the tradeoffs with other goals have already taken place : the
amount xsc
	
that will be allocated to OSH has already been selected .
The above defines an optimal allocation of risk bearing, after the budget
decision xsc was reached .
Ideally, one would consider a production as well as consumption
model where the agents produce the resources xsc as well as consume it. The
sum xsc should then also be decided in an optimal way, derived from indi-
vidual preferences, or from a social welfare function . As this example
shows, efficiency criteria for regulation or for disseminating informa-
tion, can be used to derive optimal rules of allocation without necessarily
using cost-benefit approaches .
The above criterion can be somewhat complex to apply since it
would require some knowledge (through econometric analysis) of the in-
dividual's preferences .
One can alternatively use another, related cost-efficiency
criterion . Assume that as before there has been a social decision about
the total amount of funds to be used to promote OSH . A goal for the
government could be to try to obtain as much a total increase of OSH as
possible .
We leave for Section VI the secondary efficiency problem of how to
best use the funds to monitor policy, and what are the best instruments
to use in each case to concentrate here on the conceptual issue
of rules for efficient overall use of OSH funds .
For every sector and activity under consideration there is a curve
that gives the cost of promoting OSH . See Figure 4 .
G(c) = Expected increase in OSH by use of standard 1 up to cost c
H(C-c) = Expected increase in OSH obtained by use of standard 2
up to a cost C-c .
J(c)
	
= G (c) + H(C-c),
c * solves Max J(c) , and satisfies G'(c* ) = H'( C-c * )
c
Notice that we have assumed that each standard is used in its
most efficient way , i .e . minimizing cost per unit of OSH
gain .
Figure 4
A cost-efficient procedure would be one that attempts to achieve
the greatest OSH gain for the level of expenditure . See also Zeckhauser
and Nichols (72 ] . For a total sum of money allocated, C, the largest
benefits in terms of increased OSH will be obtained if the marginal costs
of promoting a certain OSH gain were equal across standazds . For example,
in Figure 4, the point c* indicates a cost-efficient solution ; for a total
sume of money allocated C, the sum of the OSH gains obtained by both
standards is maximized at c*, therefore the standard 1 is applied up to
where it reaches the cost c*, and the standard 2 up to where it reaches the
cost C - c* . The reasoning implicit in Figure 4 above is as follows :
if for a certain standard an additional dollar can bring about a higher
expected increase in OSH than for another, efficiency indicates the
first standard should be given priority over the second . Here the word
'standard' is used to indicate the instrument of regulation, and not a
goal of the regulation or level of OSH .
If we similarly apply this criterion across sectors or activities,
or across classes of workers, and if the goal is to maximize the total ex-
pected amount of lives saved or of prevented illness for the total given
allocation of OSH funds, efficiency indicates that the marginal cost of (a
unit of). OSH gain (lives saved or lost workdays prevented) be equalized
across sectors or activities, or classes of workers . If gains of lives
saved are going to be measured in some unit,to compare(for purposes of
efficiency of allocation of OSH resources) across activities or classes of
workers, then life valuation should be equalized across the different
areas . If an additional dollar can bring about a higher expected increase in
the amount of lives saved in one class of worker or activity than in another,
to maximize total expected gains indicates that the dollar should be allo-
cated in the first class of workers or activity . To the extent that the
different classes of activities or workers are given different life
valuations, a cost benefit analysis could indicate the contrary . For
instance, if the life saved in the second activity had a higher 'shadow
price' than the one in the first activity cost benefit analysis may favor
the allocation of the dollar into the second activity .
The above described criteria however apply only when the secondary
efficiency problem referred to above is solved : we assumed that each
standard is used in the most efficient way, i .e . minimizing cost per unit of
OSH gain. This gives the curves G
	
and H in Figure 4 .
A related analysis has been proposed in a U .K. study at the Science
Policy Research Unit of the University of Sussex by C . Sinclair, P . Mastrand
and P . Newick, "Innovation and Human Risk" . This study is of interest
here because a cost-effective (rather than a cost benefit) approach is
used to study appropriate OSH risks and the empirical studies carried
there were based on this criterion . It thus demonstrates practical
utilization of a cost efficient approach . The case-studies carried out
were of worker safety in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, steel handling and
trawling in Great Britain (see [47 ] ) .
The method can now be summarized as follows . It is assumed that
each level of expenditure on prevention 'P' entails a corresponding level of
OSH damage 'A' at a risk level 'r' (see Figure 5) . Increasing 'P' could
reduce both 'A' and 'r' .
Figure 5
For a given technological situation there will be decreasing returns
to 'P' as the additional measures become more expensive or less effec-
tive in reducing risk . Cost arising from legal and administrative methods
should also be included . If it is decided to call the risk cost the
sum of prevention cost plus damage cost, A and P, then some risk level
will give a minimum value for the sum (:'optimum' in Figure 5) .
Damage costs 'A' are made up of ascertainable costs, i .e . material
damages, administration costs, medical charges, and also less tangible
or more subjective ones such as the 'value' of life . In Figure 6 below
two values have been given to the subjective item producing two 'total' curves
(Ti and T2 ) and hence two mini.=na . Similarly, if the prevention cost curve is
uncertain for a given damage curve,different minima and hence optimum risk
levels will be found. If we however assume that the prevention curve is
known, then for present prevention damages and assuming the present
situation is optimal, a particular damage curve is fixed and a particular
life valuation is implicit . Applying this analysis to expenditures of
different kinds made in different activites and industries, a range of
implicit life valuations emerges . The costs of altering these implicit
life valuations can be inferred from the prevention curve and numerical
indicators obtained for policy making in this field . By taking the
above described criterion that wide variation of valuations obtained in
this way are unsatisfactory, we have a criterion for risk setting . Under
certain
	
conditions this coincides with the equalization of marginal
costs of promoting OSH . Areas where valuations are low become the
target for further OSH effort .
It is very difficult to optimize over a wide range of activities so
that both benefits and risks are rationally distributed . It is possible
by using the above method, however, to suboptimize across a set of
sectors and activities so that at least the distribution of expenditures
attempts to achieve the greatest OSH gain for the leve of expenditure
it entails .
Determination of implicit life valuation
OSH
costs
(including
prevention
costs )
Figure 6
III . THE ROLE OF THE MAP=
The advantages of decentralized decision making are significant .
These advantages are even more evident when the costs of more centralized
policy making are taken into account . The competitive market mechanism
provides one form of decentralized decision making which has attained impressive
accomplishments in some areas . In an economy with a very large free enter-
prise component, any efficient policy should be designed with the market
behavior in mind for at least two reasons . One is that whenever the de-
centralized market mechanism can be expected to bring about an efficient
outcome, there may be significant cost savings if the market is allowed_
to operate unhindered . The other reason is that markets do react to
policymaking by the government, and these effects have to be taken into
account when planning policies . Otherwise, as in the examples given in
the last section, policymaking may end up producing results which are
further away than before from the very objective it is supposed to reach .
Because of these reasons, it is important in order to determine the
appropriate regulatory role for the government to understand what is the
most that can be expected from markets, where do markets succeed and
where they may fail ..
The OSH characteristics of competitive market outcomes depend on
individual choices (both workers and employers) in situations of risks and
uncertainty (:)r imperfect information) . These two properties are
different : because even if fully informed about the probability of
accident or sickness associated with a technique or exposure to a
substance, there is a risk since it is not known whether the event will
occur or not . Uncertainty appears when the risks (i .e . the probability
of different events to occur) are not fully known . We may have an idea
of the risk involved . However, in general, there is uncertainty . Our
information about the risks is imperfect, if only because it is only valid
in statistical terms . in addition, in the OSH area our lack of infor-
mation, even in statistical terms, is very large .
Market outcomes when there are risks have special characteristics ;
however under certain conditions the competitive market outcomes can be
expected to assure Pareto optimal distribution of risks . See for
instance Arrow [ 3 ] . However, as mentioned above, a Pareto optimal
distribution may be quite unequal ; since in general there are many Pareto
optimal allocations, some with more equal distributions than others,
a government role may be to attempt to bring the economy to a more equal
but Pareto optimal distribution of risk .
In the case of deadly accidents, for instance, an allocation of OSH resources
geared towards a more equal distribution of risk may be in addition prefer-
able under certain conditions from the point of view of the cost-efficiency
criterion discussed in the previous section (e .g . of maximizing the total ex-
pected number of lives saved for a given budget) .
Wage Differentials in Perfectly Competitive Markets
In an ideal market situation each worker is well informed and
everybody shares the same information . The worker is confronted with
a schedule of wages and risks in different occupations . The worker has a utility
function depending on wages, OSH, and leisure, of the form u = u(w, OSH, 1),
whose indifference surfaces are as in Figure 1 of Section II . For each level of
leisure the worker trades higher OSH for higher wages according to his/her
preference . The choice of the worker is determined by the maximization
of his/her utility within the obvious constraints .
6lith perfect information the worker's utility can be thought
of as being dependent on the expected value of OSH at a certain job
choice, this expected value being determined by the well informed pro-
babilities of states of the world to occur .
In the same ideal situation described above, the firm chooses the
expected level of OSH (with the minimal costs levels associated to bring
these about) and the wages it offers . Since higher OSH costs may mean
lower wages (because workers may be willing to provide labor for lower wages
provided OSH is higher) the firms' problem is symmetrical to that of the
worker . In a perfect market equilibrium the results of well informed
choices of workers and firms is Pareto optimal--no other choice will make
everybody better off . In addition, the firm sets an optimal level of
risk since it minimizes the sum of expected OSH hazards and the costs
incurred in attaining those expected OSH levels .
Evidence of the existence of wage differentials for hazardous
work is contained, for instance, in the U .S . Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics publication ( 60] and the works of R .E .B . Lucas [24], w . Thaler
and S . Rosen (58], and in R . Smith (48] 19 . However, the fact that market
forces lead to higher wages for workers in risky jobs does not mean that a
premium actually given for risk is the one that would occur if the market was
perfectly competitive . Certain characteristics of the market may prevent
a fully competitive outcome . An argument put forth by Smith [52 ] is that
firms are the 'middlemen' between the ultimate consumers of safety, their
employees, and the producers of it (suppliers of safe equipment) . Unless
the costs and benefits of different OSH levels can be transferred fully
to employees, he argues, there will be an undersupply of safety--employees
may not produce the amount of safety that their workers are 'willing to
pay' . This may occur, for instance, if workers would not be fully
mobile .
There are many instances where these imperfections of the market may
occur ; they are studied in more detail in Section IV .
191n ( 52]°it is reported that J . Chelius who used data on individual
firms in thirteen states, found, in contrast, no evidence of wage
premiums in high-risk industries [ 15], 1974 . Furthermore premiums
are in general less responsive to health than they are to safety
hazards .
Characteristics of Market Allocations : Efficiencv and Distribution
The perfect competitive market equilibrium described above has very
desirable properties of efficiency . When individual preferences and
firms' production functions are continuous and convex, there is perfect
divisibility of all goods (including OSH) produced and traded,
utilities are an increasing function of their arguments, no externalities
or increasing returns exist and everybody has perfect information, a
competitive market equilibrium is Pareto optimal, or Pareto efficient . 20
No other allocation will make every individual better off .
	
As we
discussed above, this applies to allocation of risks as well .
With respect to distributional questions, however, even if the
outcome of a perfect competitive market is Pareto optimal there is no
presumption that it produces allocations which are fair or desirable
from a social welfare point of view . As said above, an allocation of
the economy is Pareto optimal if no other reallocation of available re-
sources will improve everybody's situation including OSH levels . Such an
allocation can be considered optimal in the sense of efficient use of
resources ; it has also a stability property : the actors are 'locked
in' at such an allocation if everyone has veto power . For someone will always
lose, and hence oppose, if there is a move away from that allocation .
However, in such an allocation the relative shares of
one group may be very small compared with those of the other group .
20 Cases where externalities, increasing returns to scale and imperfect
information exist are studied in Section IV .
See point y in Figure 7 below.
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The thick curved line indicates the set of Pareto optimal allocations
Figure 7
In addition, with externalities in the market, utility functions may be
non-convex and the Pareto optimal set may be discontinuous, as in
Figure 7 .
	
In such cases, a gradual transition from 6 to a more
egalitarian Pareto optimal position such as x in Figure 7 may not be
possible without sidestepping to non-Pareto optimal allocations in
the way (e .g . the point z in Figure 7) . In that case one must temporarily
forego certain competitive market equilibria in order to reach others
equilibria outcomes which are both efficient and more egalitarian .
Externalities in the cases of marekts where one of the goods is OSH
come naturally : the health of one individual, for instance, affects
the utility of his or her whole family . If
there are, as in the U .S . at present, already existing income security
transfers for families Where the working member which contributes mainly
to the support is disabled, then Lthrough taxes)the disability of this
individual affects all other members of society . Therefore the OSH of
an individual cannot in general be considered a private good .
Markets for Risk Bearina
As discussed above, even when there are risks competitive market
equilibria could reach Pareto efficient allocations if the appropriate
conditions are satisfied . Since existence of risks is a general
phenomenon across the economy, and there exists special parts of the
market that deal with it, such as insurance markets and securities
markets, it is worth examining the parts of the market that could deal
with OSH risk bearing .
An insurance market is a natural candidate for a market for OSH
risk bearing .
	
In fact such a market exists to insure against post-injury
compensation to employees as provided by Workmen's Compensation laws . If
Workmen's Compensation laws were comprehensive enough, the questions are : what pr
vents these markets from being adequate providers of risk spreading in the
case of OSH? If they are not offering a necessary insurance coverage, can
their ability be expanded?
By understanding their restrictions on the insurability of OSH risks
for firms, we can be in a better position to understand what could be the
government role in improving the market for risk bearing as a whole .
There are some major problems that limit the ability of OSH insurance
as a risk bearing market . We shall discuss this next .
Leaving aside problems of distribution for a moment, we concentrate
now on efficiency .
	
Insurance is not a material good; although it is
usually thought of as a service its value to the buyer is different in
kind from the utility derived from consumption of goods, or health care .
Insurance is a kind of contract that involves an exchange of money now
for money payable contingent to the occurrence of certain events .
In that sense, the closer the losses are from having money as a
possible substitute, the better can insurance play its role . We now
describe this role in some detail to be able to study better the OSH
insurance market limitations . For a more complete description, see,
for instance, Spence and Zeckhauser (55] .
Let there be s states of the world, s = 1, . . . , S . Assume the
insurance company gives the individual a payoff p(s) in state s . This
payoff is added to the individual wealth in that state w(s), to give
the total wealth of the individual as an argument to his/her utility
function in state of nature s . Under this scheme, the individual
exected utility is
(1) ju (w + p (s) , s) f (s) ds , where f (s) is the probability of
state s to occur . The break-even constraint is that the expected value
of insurance payments are equal to zero
(2) jp(s) f(s)ds = 0 .
The insurer tries to maximize (1) subject to (2) . The marginal efficiency
condition for this constrained maximization problems is that there exists
a constant a (the 'lagrange multiplier') such that
u' =
for all values of s . Therefore the optimal insurance scheme keeps the
marginal utility of income constant .
The dependence of this marginal utility value u' on the probability
of occurrence of the different states of nature is represented by the
parameter a that depends on (z) . If the individual's utility function
has wealth as its only argument, then u(w,s) '-_ u(w + s) and the
optimizing condition is
u'(w+s+p(s)) = a
which implies p(s) = k - s where k is constant . By (2) k = mean of s .
Therefore in this . latter case the optimal insurance is one that gives
the individual his/her expected income at all states .
The role of money as compensating for losses of commodities is
of course extremely important, since money is a unit of value and can be ex-
changed for other goods . However, money cannot be considered as:good a means to
compensate for losses when there is serious damage (illness or death) at one stat
that cannot be adequately reversed by incurring in expenses .
	
This case is not as
general as`it may seem: many illnesses and losses can be improved if
means are available . Loss of life, however, is a more difficult case,
but, nevertheless, life insurances are very widely purchased . This is
because of externalities as described above : the loss of the life of a
worker is a loss for his/her whole family and an important part of the
loss is material unless society has a very well furnished social welfare
system . Even in this latter case, loss of a supporting family member
may imply a big drop in the level of income, and consumption . However, the
problem of existence of goods which may not be exchangeable for money
for any individual is not peculiar to OSH ; it is generally present in
society .
It may not be possible to equalize marginal utility u' at all
states if death, loss of limb or irreversible illness are some of them,
and hence the optimal insurance rule given above may not be attainable .
These cases, for that reason, deserve a different treatment .
However, in the cases where the utility considered is that which is
the most that can be attained by monetary expenditures, the rule,
u' = a constant at all states, still holds . One case is when the
worker regards the utility of his/her family and dependents as almost
a substitute for his or her utility .
Even when the above factors are not considered, i .e . when money is
assumed to substitute (at least to an extent) for losses, the problem
in the case of OSH insurance is complex . This is because the probability
distribution of the states of health s is not only given by nature, but it
depends crucially on the behavior of the firm . In other words, the
return in a state s not only depends on the states of nature but also
on the actions of the firm . As discussed above and in (52 1 the firm can be
seen to behave as an agent which is intermediate to the consumption of
OSH for the worker, and whose actions affect the probability of state s
to occur . We shall study this problem in the next section .
IV . MARKET I14PERFECTIONS
In the last section we examined what is the most that can be expected
of markets,under the best conditions, in terms of efficiency of produc-
tion and distribution of OSH . The behavior of risk
bearing markets under perfect information was discussed . In this section
we shall study in more detail some of the imperfections that stand in
the way of efficient market behavior in order to detect areas where
policy intervention may be needed .
In the first place we discuss imperfections in the insurance market
for post-injury compensation by firms . Because of the inability of the insurer
monitor the firm's actions on behalf of improved OSH, the risk spreading
of this market is not optimal . Alternative insurance schemes and their
limitations are discussed .
Next we discuss the problem of imperfect information about the level
of OSH of the firm from the worker's . viewpoint .
	
Possible asymmetry of
information may create an 'adverse selection' problem where there is an
incentive for firms to invest in a less than optimal way on OSH .
We then discuss the quasi public good problem of standards within
the firms, wherein heterogeneous preferences among the workers and
existence of infra-marginal workers may lead to inappropriate levels of OSH .
Finally we discuss OSH externalities and also the externalities that
appear in the markets of production of OSH and of information about OSH .
Imperfect Information
At the end of Section III we discussed the role of insurance mar-
kets in shifting OSH risks . we shall now discuss more in detail the
limitations or imperfections of OSH insurance markets for firms .
Insurance Markets for Post-Injury Compensation by Firms
in society as a whole the role of insurance markets to -spread risks so as to
protect risk averse individuals from suffering the full consequences of adverse
outcomes about which there is uncertainty is quite limited . Ideally,
such a market should offer to an individual the possibility of betting,
at fixed odds, any amount he or she wishes on the occurrence of any
event which will affect his or her welfare . The premium (or odds)
should be determined as a price in any other market, by equating supply
with demand . If all individuals have the same resources, identical
probabilities about states (independent of their actions) and utilities,
and if all returns are monetary, the results of the last section apply :
optimal insurance is one where marginal utility is equalized across
states . If the utilities are only dependent on income (or wealth), the
optimal insurance would be the one that always gives his or her expected income .
However, the imperfect information on OSH hazards and the fact that
the probabilities about states of health are dependent on the behavior
or actions of the firms changes the nature of the problem .
Let us assume that all returns are monetary, and that utilities
depend on wealth . In fact, this is close to what happens in the actual
behavior of OSH insurance markets under workmen's Compensation which
shifts the insurance problem to employers . Since the employer
pays the insurance premium (and collects the payoff) in order to insure
against post-injury compensation to employees, this case corresponds to
the above assumption : for the firm all costs and returns are monetary .
We shall study here this problem, leaving aside for a moment the
question of the worker's compensation, which is discussed in more. detail
later in this Section and also in Sections V and VI . Even if there was a
perfect insurance market for employers, unless the compensations to the
workers were more adequate than at present, the risk-bearing would be
shifted to workers in a less than optimal way ; see, for instance, the
discussion in (55 l, Section II .
It is not difficult to see why the economic system has not
developed a more complete market for OSH risk bearing . Insurance is
limited in scope (many risks are classified uninsurable) and insurance
is frequently limited as to amount . From the economic viewpoint these
two limitations are due to the fact that the insurer must resort to
direct controls over the insured, because the insurer
cannot distinguish between the risks and the actions of the insured . An
outcome is a mixture of unavoidable risk against which the insurer is
willing to insure, and human decisions . If the insured has a reason
to reduce losses through its actions, there is no problem . But if the
existence of an insurance policy may lead to a motive to relax OSH
precautions at the plant or costs (the so-called 'moral hazard' problem),
the insurer or risk bearer will be bearing higher risks than agreed .
Either the insurer will refrain from
insuring or else it will have to resort to direct inspection and control .
This will restrict the amounts to be _.nsured for, and the scope of the
insurance so as to minimize losses .
In short, any insurance market for spreading OSH hazards in the form
of returns to firms for post-injury compensations to workers will imply
a need for standards and direct controls over the firms, even under
ideal conditions of information and compensation for the workers that in-
stitute claims . If the government takes the role of controlling, for
the sake of insurers, the OSH conditions in the firms, such forms of
insurance would imply government action that would not differ very much
in practical terms from any other form of government control for monitor-
ing standards . The decentralized action of markets for risk bearing
would not then yield net savings .
One way to take into consideration firms' actions on OSH that
eliminatessome of direct control costs is to rank firms by their past
experiences of injury or illness of their workers . Such ranking is
already in practice in existing insurance schemes . However, at pre-
sent for the vast majority of firms, insurance premiums are not ade-
quately tied to their injury experience . The relationship between premiums and
injury experience rises with firm size .
	
This may be due to the fact that
in the group of smaller firms there may be a larger proportion of short-
lived firms, and if firms are short-lived it is harder to use their
experiences to rank the premiums .
Businesses with 10 or fewer employees are in fact exempt from most of
the record keeping (see Ashford f 7 ]) . This is because small
firms may face special difficulties in complying with OSH regulations ;
	
in
fact the OSH act includes a special provision for reduced penalties and
loans to aid small businesses to comply with standards . Firms with less
than 25 employees make up about 90% of all firms, and during 1975
only 55% of inspections were carried in those firms . See (671 .
As reported in (52], at present even in firms with 1,000 employees
a 10% rise in injuries would reduce premiums by only 3% ; only for firms
with more than 3,000 workers the premium becomes fully responsive to the
injury rate . This was reported from L . Russell (44] .
If workers were insured and compensated directly for injuries and/or
illnesses by the insurer (or the firm) according, for instance, to a given
fixed scale, this would eliminate some court costs . There could be, how-
ever, a problem of lack of incentives on the part of the workers . At
present, the workmen's compensation requires the worker to incur certain
costs to collect a compensation, and this acts as an incentive to prevent
OSH losses . The costs associated with control described above, in the case
of the workers would be smaller because, in principle, the incentive
to prevent injuries or illness is still present for workers even when
compensation is available . This, of course, is not true for many
injuries or illnesses for which the 'moral hazard' problem for the
worker still would exist, but would be true for major or irreversible
ones . At least, the incentive for workers to prevent OSH losses would
be larger than for employers .
However, a related problem of incentive for controlling OSH levels
by the firm would arise if it is the workers who pay the premiums, while
it is the firm that sets the standards . This could be somewhat avoided
in a system in which both workers and firms pay premiums and coinsurance .
The coinsurance rates and premiums for workers could be set according to
OSH odds at desired levels, while the premiums and the coinsurance
rates for the firm could be determined so as to compensate the insurer for
differential risks, according to the difference between the desired
levels and the ones actually experienced by that firm .
This last specification would give the firms an incentive for
setting better OSH levels, and, because of the existence of coinsurance,
the workers' 'moral hazard' problem would be somewhat diminished .
However, such a solution would be at most a second best one . To
achieve the appropriate incentives, the insurance plan must sacrifice
some of its risk-spreading capabilities and this implies a loss of
efficiency . This is discussed in more detail below . In addition, rating by past
experience
	
would not be as appropriate for smaller or shorter-lived
firms which are difficult to rate for the past experiences of injuries/
illness . Therefore, it becomes clear that a classification of policies
by firm size as well as length of existence may be needed for studying
what may be the most appropriate policies . For instance, for those firms
that cannot be rated by experience, only coinsurance rates should be
relied upon to create incentives .
The above reasoning can be formalized using the theory developped in
( 55] . we first study the case where the firms insure against post-injury
compensation . As before, assume that all firms have identical resources,
utility functions and probability distributions . Assume as before that
utility depends on wealth only, and that each firm can take an action
denoted as consisting, for instance, of OSH expenditures to
expected post-injury compensation . At each state s, let J(s,a) be the
injuries compensation costs to the employer in state s with action a .
In order to compare outcomes we study the case where the insurer
does know, for instance, the amount of injury compensation of the firm,
denoted J, and also the cost of the action taken by the firm . The
firm's wealth at each state s is
(1) w = wo + J + p(J,a) - a
where wo is initial wealth and p(J,a) is the payoff by the insurer to
the firm. The firm chooses its OSH action (a) so that its expected
utility, given by
(2) fu(wo + J(s,a) - p(J(s,a),a) -a]f(s)ds
is maximized .
A constraint for the insurer is that total expected payoff be
equal to zero, i .e .
(3)
	
fp(J(s,a) , a) f (s) ds = 0 .
for the a that maximizes (2) . for the given payoff p(J,a) . By making the
payoff p(J,a) sufficiently negative if a # a where a is a chosen action
by the firm, the insurer has control in this particular case over the
firm's action.
Therefore the insurer's problem is to choose an action a* and a
corresponding payoff p(J,a*) that maximizes (2) subject to (3) . The
optimal p(J,a*) would then be determined as in the case discussed in
Section III by the condition that marginal utility be equal across
states, i .e .
(4) u' = a
Therefore the outcome is efficient . Note that (4) implies in this case
that
(5) dP(J,a*)
dJ
We shall discuss the loss of efficiency that occurs when the firm
cannot be controlled directly in terms of the action it takes about OSH,
but when the insurer can only deduce it through the injury compensation
costs the firm incurs on J . The payoff function of the insurer is made
then to depend on J onliz, i .e . p = p(J) . The insurer then selects
p(J) to maximize the expected utility of the firm as in (2) above,
subject to two constraints . One is that total expected payoffs be
equal to zero, i .e . equation (3) above . The second is that a be selected
so as to maximize (2) subject to the given p(J) .
This second constraint can be given by the derivative of (2) with
respect to a equal to zero, i .e .
(6)
	
j [a=7 + p' ~BJ~ _ 1] u' f (s) ds = 0
3a 3a)
The marginal condition for the optimal payoff function for the
insurer is
Xu° + u' [1 + a
	
+ X J/1 J(f') I - s = o
ds as as as as f
where X and d are the 'lagrangian multipliers' associated to the two
constraints . In this case the payoff depends directly on the distribu-
tion function f(s) . Also, the marginal utility of wealth is not con-
stant across states as before, since a P # -1, which was the efficiency
condition (5) derived before when the actions of the firm as well as Jl
were known by the insurer .
The question of incentives versus efficiency becomes now clear . It
is not desirable to keep marginal utility (or wealth) constant across
states . See [55], Case III . The payoff function p (J) must be such
that wealth at each state is an increasing function of the insurance
payoff received . This is because, as the insurance payoff is positively
related to the firm performance, the insured firm does not otherwise
have an incentive to take a (positive cost) action towards better OSH
performance . To achieve this incentive, the insurance plan violates
the condition of efficiency (marginal utility constant across states)
and risk spreading is not optimal .
These results indicate deficiencies of OSH risk bearing markets .
Since firms cannot be adequately provided with post-injury compensation
insurance, they cannot afford to serve as a proper 'middleman' between
the ultimate consumers of OSH (the workers) and the producers of it .
Even if firms could be made to bear the full cost of OSH hazards,
through a more comprehensive schedule of Workmen's Compensation, firms
could not be well insured about such risks . They would, in those cases
have to bear risk in such unoptimal ways that it might impair their
economic functioning--and perhaps these negative effects would be trans-
ferred to the workers also .
The difference between the insurance payoff that satisfies the con-
dition of efficiency and the one that is given as a solution to (7)
above is a measure of the inability to observe the OSH actions of the
firm, or of the costs (administrative or informational) that may be
involved in observing them .
The second best problem is to find the combination of incentives
and of degree of efficiency that minimizes total expected losses . Two
different premium schedules would have to be established for the firm
and for the worker corresponding to the above analysis . For those
injuries and accidents whose avoidance depend mostly on worker's pre-
cautions (e .g. wearing some equipment) the incentives (coinsurance
rates) would have to be placed more on the worker than on the firm.
	
The
loss of efficiency would otherwise be larger for the worker as well .
For those accidents or injuries that are mostly related to the firm's
actions, the incentive would have to be placed more on the firm .
For those firms whose size is too small to have a statistically
sound basis to observe J, other direct control means would be more
adequate . The second best solution would be attained (at least for
larger or longer lived firms) by minimizing the total sum of efficiency
losses and losses due to lack of proper incentives .
OSH
losses
E+O
0 2 =
OSH losses due to lack of proper
1 ~. .~ incentives by workers
deviation of payoff function from the one that
assures efficiency, i .e . marginal utility constant
across states , in order to provide OSH incentives .
In Figure 8 there are two schedules of OSH losses due to the lack of
proper incentives : one for the firm and another for the worker . It is
assumed here that the types of losses considered are serious or ir-
reversible enough that the 'moral hazard' problem of the worker is
less important than the corresponding problem of lack of motivation of
the firm. By segregating the premiums and coinsurance rates for these
two groups as proposed, the second best can have a higher level of
efficiency as well as a lower level of losses than otherwise . This fact
points towards a possible
	
policy recommendation . Whenever possible,
in cases as those depicted in Figure 8, the introduction of new informa-
tion and of preventive devices may be more efficient if they are of the
type that relies more in decision making by the worker than by the
firm . In Sections V and VI the possible role of the government in this
area is discussed .
Note that in all the above the lack of information about probabili-
ties p(s) of occurence of events was not considered directly--lack of
information was mostly mentioned with respect to actions of the firms .
However, by influencing the outcomes by their actions on behalf of OSH
the fines can be seen as influencing the probabilities of these events .
An analysis similar to the one given above could be carried out assuming
that the probabilities p(s) depend on actions a(s), i .e . p - p(s,a) .
The above cases must be distinguished from others in which
there is a serious lack of information about p(s) for all concerned .
For instance, as mentioned above for many years the dangers of vinyl
chloride were unknown . This was in part related to the long 'latent
periods' of the illnesses related to their substance, up to 20-35 years .
Such cases indicate the need for another classification of OSH for
policy purposes : by the general existing degree of information of the
effects of a technique or substance . Since this information level
relates to how new the substance is (or how long it has been in use) the
classification should distinguish older from newly introduced techniques
to establish which would be a more appropriate policy . This point is
further developed in Section V .
An important problem in the above is the setting of the scale for
compensation of injuries and/or illnesses . It is beyond this analysis
to study whether legislation should be passed to aid the use of the
court system in obtaining compensation, or whether compensation should
be determined outside of the courts . However, some general comments are
applicable .
When enough information is available with respect to exposure
levels, substances or technique hazards, the costs of the injury and
the firm which has caused the injury, a direct compensation would be
preferable to compensation mediated by the courts . Smith [52] proposes a
similar approach, calling it an 'injury tax' which could be made pro-
portional to the cost of each case being remitted to the federal govern-
ment, either directly or indirectly through the insurance companies .
The employer could choose its action to avoid OSH losses, and workers and
labor unions would serve the role that employers serve to the IRS in
providing verification of wages and salaries to the government . in
Table B-2, Appendix B of ( 521, evidence is submitted to the effect
that work injury rates are inversely proportional to the costs to
employees of injuries . Employees are responsive to added costs to their
firms because of injuries . This was computed by regressing the injury
frequency rate A on the change in total injury costs M caused by a change
in the number of injuries, I, the price of safety inputs P s , a variable
representing the level of inherent risk R, and a random error term, e .
The parameters a, 6 and y of the following equation were estimated
A=a(In + sR+YP S +e
dI
The results were obtained by using data on thirty manufacturing indus-
tries . Based on those results Smith suggests a schedule of fines that
would be required to reduce injury by certain rates, i .e . how responsive
is the injury rate to such 'taxes' . For a fine of $1,000 .00 a low
estimate of 4 .4% to a high estimate of 6 .2% is given ; for a fine of
$2,000 .00 a low estimate of 8 .8% to a high of 12 .5% is given ; and for a
fine of $3,000 .00 a low estimate of 17 .6% to a high of 25 .0% is given .
Most OSH injuries are temporary, involving more than 95% of all work
injuries . As reported by Smith, in manufacturing a total cost of
injury to the worker (inclduing wages and medical expenses) were about
$525 in 1970 . The figures on medical costs were obtained from the
National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (Compendium)( 301 .
The typical work loss was of about 15 days according to the U .S .
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (63] .
Ideally the amounts of such forms of incentives and compensation
should be determined by the rules discussed in Section Il to improve
overall safety in a cost-effective way for a given budget .
For many instances of occupational health, however, the conditions
are less appropriate for such compensating procedures thar.they are for
safety hazards . One problem is that the worker may have been emplc;yed by
several firms and/or there may be a long latency period for an illness .
In these cases it is difficult to detect the firm that has contributed
to this event . In addition, when the illness is induced by a newly
introduced substance and its total expected costs are unknown or where
there is a large component of pain and suffering, a court procedure may
be of help . From the point of view of prevention, the setting and
monitoring of standards would probably be more appropriate in these cases .
Asymmetry of Information about OSH
A second problem of imperfect information arises if there is some
asymmetry on the level of information on OSH from the point of view of
the workers and of the firm . For instance, the worker may know less
about the actual statistics of OSH hazards in each available job than
each firm does .
	
There is some empirical evidence that workes information
about OSH levels is imperfect .
notorious) without knowing precisely what techniques or precautions
each firm is offering . Workers may for instance grade jobs
some statistic of the industry or sector . From the point of view of
each firm there might be an incentive to reduce costs on OSH since the
benefits of higher OSH costs (e .g . lower labor costs) cannot be obtained
since they are not perceived by the worker . If the firm engages in
providing information to prospective workers about the level of OSH
that it offers, the costs of this information to the firm have to be
deduced from the benefits in terms of lower labor costs . In short, there
is a dampened incentive to improve OSH levels . If most firms follow
this behavior, there would be a collective incentive to lower general
OSH levels . This problem can be formalized as follows . Suppose that
the supply of labor function of a worker is derived from constrained
utility maximization . The utility of the worker u is a function
u = u(1, w, m) .
where 1 is leisure, w wages, and m represents expected (average) OSH
level . The supply of labor will then be a function S(w, m) . Both the
demand for labor by a firm and also the average OSH levels offered by
the firm will depend upon wages, i .e .
D °_ D (w) ,
	
and m = m(w) .
At an equilibrium in the labor market
S (w, m (w)) = D (w) .
Suppose there are two firms : one offers a schedule of average OSH
wages represented by the curve ml (w) and the other by the curve m2 (w)
so that at wages higher than w firm one offers more average OSH than firm
two . (See Figure 9) .
Workers perceive the average OSH level of firms of one type,
m (W)
	
-_ mlM + m2 (w)
mi indicates the minimum between m and m . Because of the
asymmetry in information , there will be a collective incentive
for firms to lower their OSH levels to mi (w) .
Figure 9
employment
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N
I
I
	
D (w)
D(w) - cost of information
If workers perceive the average OSH level of firms one and two
i .e .
m(w)
	
= m1 (w) + m2 (w)
then they offer a supply of labor curve S(w,m(w)), see Figure 10 .
Equilibrium levels of wages and employment will be w* and N*
respectively . Firm 1 should actually have an equilibrium with lower
wages, w1* because it offers more average OSH . To obtain the benefits
of its higher OSH level, it may engage in providing information at a
cost A . If a is high enough, since information costs must be added to
labor costs, it may shift D(w) to D(w) - A, undoing the benefits
for the firm of the higher average OSH this firm offers . Therefore
Finn 1 may have an incentive to offer m(w), so as to reduce costs and
still obtain similar benefits . In that case the average OSH level of
both firms decreases to a lower level . In this situation there is a
collective incentive to overall decrease average OSH . The process does
not end until the thick average safety line mi in Figure 9 is reached,
yielding less than optimal levels of OSH as a whole .
A similar problem would arise if firms would purchase post-injury
compensation insurance and the insurer would only be able to observe
the statistic m~(as the workers in the example above) . There would be a
collective incentive to decrease overall m, yielding less than optimal
levels of OSH .
It would seem that when there is a problem of lack of information
as in those cases discussed above, government action directed towards
increasing the level of information may be helpful . In fact, there is
some evidence that both OSHA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission
have considered placing a higher priority on the provision of information
within their functions . See, for instance, Cornell, Noll and Weingast
[19 ], Owen and Schultz (eds .) and U .S . Department of Labor RFD/A 76-10,
[64] .
	
As [ lg] and [ 72] report it, Congress has not supported
these attempts, placing a higher priority on promulgation and enforcement
of standards .
It is clear that for policy making purposes it would be useful to have a
classification of cases that would detect where the most gains in effi-
ciency can be obtained by providing information (such as in the cases
discussed above) .
Firms with Risky Technologies
There may be other cases with imperfect information where the
government may have to intervene not only to provide information but
also to provide efficient risk-spreading because insurance markets may
not be able to do so .
A problem arises for insurance provision for firms with risky
technologies to spread the risks of post-injury compensation costs .
This is a so-called 'adverse selection' problem well known in the theory
of insurance . It has some arguments in common with the 'moral hazard'
problem and can be thought of as being an aspect of it .
The problem may be summarized as follows . It may not be possible
for the insurer to provide insurance to the riskier firms at any premium .
Because, the higher the premium levels are, the higher proportion of
risky firms (low average OSH, high post-injury compensations) would find
the insurance attractive . If there is imperfect information about the
OSH levels, the insurer may not be able to distinguish them. This can
be seen as follows :
Let the supply of insurance be a function of premium and level of
risk, S(p, OSH) . The demand of insurance depends on premiums D((p), and
the average OSH level is related to premiums OSH(p) . In equilibrium
supply must equal demand, i .e .
S (p,
	
OSH(p) ) = D (p)
If, as premiums p increase, the average OSH decreases as explained above, it is
possible that no equilibrium may exist . This means that no efficient
risk spreading can be obtained from insurance markets for firms with
very risky technologies (such as nuclear plants) .
The government action may be needed to spread these risks . Other-
wise, firms with risky technologies may not be able to operate efficiently
since they would bear too high risks . 21
However, even if the government intervenes on behalf of such firms,
if workers cannot transfer to firms their costs in terms of OSH losses
(due, for instance, to very limited workmen's compensation), then workers would
be bearing these costs themselves . There is in such cases transfer of risk
from the firms to the workers that is not only unequal, but also inefficient
for society as a whole .
In the above we discussed several cases where the government role
for pooling and disseminating information could be helpful in improving
the functioning of markets, and general welfare .
21An example of government action of this sort is the Price-Anderson Act
which limits the liability of nuclear power plants .
There are, however, several limitations to what can be accomplished
if the role of the government is limited to gathering and disseminating
information . These are discussed in more detail in Section V about the
government role .
Even if relevant information about OSH was available, it would
still be difficult for workers to make fully informed decisions as
required for a competitive market equilibrium to obtain . One reason is
that there is a limit as to the amount of information that can be
pooled and disseminated, as well as to the amount of information that
can be absorbed and classified by the workers . Also, the production
and distribution of information may itself contain some public good
aspects . This is discussed further in the part of this Section about
externalities in the production of OSH information .
In addition, with respect to newer chemicals or processes, the
information may be such that the worker must make decisions where very
low probabilities are concerned . Empirical evidence shows that indi
viduals rate poorly in making decisions when very low probability
events are concerned . See for instance the work of Tversky and Kahneman
[531 . It is possible that the higher quit rates observed empirically
in Viscusi [68] are due in some cases more to an improvement of de-
cision making with very low probabilities (when the demonstration
effects on other workers are felt) than to an improvement of information .
For instance, a smoker that is aware of the probability bf contract-
ing lung cancer may change his behavior towards tobacco when a friend
or a member of the family dies of lung cancer .
OSH as a Quasi Public Good
There are other imperfections in the labor market that may pre-
vent the economy from attaining appropriate levels of OSH even in a
world of perfect information . The existence of large firms (monopolists).
that face an upward sloping labor supply curve may be one . If the
value of wages and OSH levels are set in such markets, in equilibrium
lower wage/OSH combinations will occur in this situation than if markets
were competitive . This situation may also be related to the existence
of fixed costs for worker's mobility, both geographic and across
occupations .
Another added problem that would appear to be more associated with
large firms relates to the setting of OSH levels . OSH levels in a
firm are likely 'to be set simultaneously for all workers .
	
Since they
cannot be expected to be chosen on a worker-by-worker basis as
implied in the discussion of the perfectly competitive markets, we may
have a case for a market failure .
Having chosen a technique of production (certain substances,
machinery, etc .) the firm will offer all of its workers, except for very
minor variations, much the same levels of OSH, such as a plane of a
certain type will offer all its passengers much the same level of
safety . The assumption is that there are fixed costs that may prevent
the adoption of more than one technique of production . The OSH level
in the firm becomes then a (quasi) public good . If the determination
of the OSH level (associated to the technique of production) is an
endogeneous variable for the firm, then there may be a competitive
market failure since group returns and individual returns may differ,
and marginal analysis may fail to yield optimality .
The source of the potential competitive market failure is similar
to that of the analysis of Spence (56] for product quality setting by mono-.
polies . It can be described as follows . If the firm is contemplating
to inprove by a small amount its OSH level, OSH costs will increase, say
by an amount Ac . wage premiums, in that case, may decrease . The
increase in OSH level increases the benefit to the marginal worker who
is just willing to be hired at the going wage by approximately Ow(x), where x
the number of workers .
	
Total wage costs for the firm then decrease by
xAw(x) . Therefore the increase is desirable for the firm if xAw(x) > Ac .
However, xAw(x) is not an appropriate measure of the benefits
of the increase in OSH for the workers at the firm as a whole . The OSH
increase is socially desirable if the average benefit
1/xfxo Gwi-n)dn exceeds the average cost Ac/x. The firm's problem would
yield a gain in welfare if total benefits fOAw(n)dn would have exceeded
the cost of the increase in OSH, Ac . The social benefits correspond to
an increase in the revenues of the firm (a decrease in costs) only if the
marginal consumer is average or representative, which corresponds to the
case when
1	
Aw(n) dn = 6,w (x) .
However, there is no reason to assume that the marginal worker will be
representative or average . In certain cases the marginal worker may have
a valuation of safety which is below that of the average worker and the
OSH standards set would be too low .
This may occur, for instance, because, as shown in [27 ], younger
workers are more mobile . The firm faces a higher proportion of such
workers than others . If the firm sets its standards for the marginal
worker, and if younger and mobile workers put less emphasis on safety,
this would produce a less than optimal choice of OSH levels by the firm .
There are models, such as that of Stafford and Cohen [57 ], that predict
in some cases this type of divergence for wages, i .e . marginal wages lower
than average wages . It would be of interest to see under what conditions,
if worker's utilities depend on wages and OSH levels, similar results can show
that marginal values of safety would be lower than average ones .
In the case described above the average value of safety becomes a difficult
question--similar to that of the optimal level of a public good . It is
also similar to the question of average valuation of quality of pro-
ducts by consumers in the market, and could be studied by similar
methods [56] . In such cases there seems to be room for some form
of government regulation . This is discussed in more detail in Section V .
Institutional Rigidities
There are several institutional rigidities that may prevent market
forces from bringing about a competitive market equilibrium outcome,
with the corresponding OSH losses . One of these,which is well under
stood is the limitation of worker's mobility . Workers, in such cases,
cannot have the choices available that would give the incentive to the
employer to improve OSH . Even after a workplace or a substance used
by a firm is known to be damaging to the health of a worker, that worker
may be 'locked' into the job .
Wage rigidities are sometimes blamed for existence of unemployment .
In such situations, less than optimal OSH outcomes are likely to occur .
Minimum wage legislation could also have similar effects . These issues
were discussed in Section II above .
Other rigidities relate to the existence of large firms which
cannot adjust OSH levels on a worker-by-worker basis . This was dis-
cussed above in this section . The role of unions may also have similar
effects . In a bargaining process, the infra-marginal worker may not be
represented in a way that would assure an optimal OSH outcome . Related
problems are discussed further in Section VI .
Institutional rigidities leave room for improvement of OSH levels
by government action :
	
this action may take the form of attempting to
eliminate the rigidities as well as, or instead of, direct regulation of
OSH .
OSH Externalities
As discussed already, the costs of the illness, injury (or death
of a worker)accrue not only to the worker, but to his/her family in the
first place, and also to society as a whole . This may give rise to
externalities .
For instance, the utility of being employed is shared by the whole
family of the worker . However, as in cases of illnesses with long latent
periods, the health risk associated to that employment may be borne mostly by
the individual (or his/her couple) rather than by the children, who might
have left the household by the time the worker is ill or deceased . The
returns of the wages and OSH obtained from employment accrue to a group
(the family) and may differ from the individual return . The worker
would take into account the expected OSH damage as well as the wage level--
while the family returns may be higher for higher wages even with lower
OSH . When individual and group returns differ, there is a loss of
Pareto optimality at the market equilibrium . In such cases, when private
and social returns differ, governmental intervention may increase the
welfare of all parties . Or, alternatively, private institutions may
arise to take advantage of the potential increases in welfare to all
parties . To the extent that such institutions may be large and tend to
concentrate power, other negative consequences may develop .
Another OSH externality is purely financial and is derived in
part from the existing income security programs . This was discussed
in some detail in Section II . Health care expenses and the expenses of
supporting families whose main wage earner has been incapacitated, ill
or deceased, are translated through social security, welfare payments
and disability insurance (and through taxes) to society as a whole .
If a firm is imposing unhealthy or dangerous conditions on its
workers, it might be obtaining effectively a transfer from the rest of
society to itself, to defray its reduced OSH costs . This is because
the firm does not pay a higher contribution to these income security
programs (social security taxes or employer's health insurance contri-
butions) if its OSH risks are higher .
The above described externalities imply that the competitive
market mechanism may not operate adequately . Neither the worker, nor
the firm are likely to fully take into account the costs of OSH risks to
the worker . In the first case, even if the family losses are internalized (for
instance, if the family internalizes the OSH damages to the wage earner), the
losses that accrue to society (via income transfers) are not likely to
be fully computed . Similarly, the firm may not have appropriate incentives to
reduce OSH losses since it does not perceive its costs fully ; they are
transferred to society . In such cases the role of the government is
to impose measures that would internalize these costs for efficient
decentralized decision making (for instance, fining firms for the OSH costs
to others that the employer does not compute as part of his/her costs) .
Alternatively the government could impose and monitor OSH standards that
are computed as efficient outcomes .
Unlike several other developed countries the United States does not
have a government operated national health insurance or national health
service covering the entire population . Medicare and other programs
provide health services to the poor . The majority of the population,
however, depends largely on private hospital and/or surgical insurance
to finance large medical expenditures [17 ] . If a form of national
health insurance is adopted in the U .S ., the government would have a
further incentive to intervene in order to promote OSH .
In the computation of the magnitude of an externality, certain pro-
blems arise . For instance, the cases where information is more difficult to
collect and disseminate are less likely to be identified as for
costs, and these costs are likely to end up being undervalued .
In addition, pain 'and suffering due, for instance, to a long illness
for which not much medical expenditures are necessary may be undervalued
also . In those cases, the worker and his/her family may bear most of
the costs . The existence of these externalities indicates the need of
adequate government intervention to promote OSH .
Externalities in the Production of OSH and of Information about OSH
There are several reasons for the possible failure of perfect
market competition to achieve optimality in the allocations for the
production of OSH (safer equipment, safer substances, etc .) or of in
formation about OSH (more information about equipment/substances whose
OSH effects are unknown) .
Some correspond roughly to classical reasons for market failure
such as indivisibilities and inappropriability . These problems have
been much studied in the literature : under the heading or marginal-
cost pricing and under that of divergence of social and private benefits
or costs .
	
The latter problem refers to the OSH production analog of
the OSH externalities discussed above . For instance, in general, the
social benefits of increasing OSH information may exceed those benefits
to the firm or individual that produces it . Therefore, no individual would have t:
incentive to gather and analyze the data him or herself . It would also
not be efficient for private business to do so . In both cases the
costs may more than compensate the social benefits, but the individual
or the firm may not be able to recuperate the costs . This is because
it may be costly in some cases to withhold information . Furthermore
to do so would be inefficient ; in social terms once the information
is available provided the marginal cost of dissemination is smaller
than the benefits of the information, the wider it is used the better .
As opposed to other public goods, information does not necessarily get
'used up' or 'crowded' (such as other public goods, for instance, public
transportation, or recreation sites) . It is only when dissemination
costs are large that there are economic limits to sharing information .
In the cases of production of OSH and of information about OSH there
is an additional source of market failure induced by uncertainty .
	
Since
they are both risky activities with unknown probabilities of returns,
unless proper risk-sharing is provided, there is bound to be some dis-
crimination against such research activities . If, as studied in Arrow
( 3 ] in the private sector it is the large firms that
are better suited to create incentives to research in this area (if
only because of large fixed cost to research or because the appropriality
of the produce may be greater under monopoly than under competition) the
problem still remains that these benefits may be offset by the
disincentive created by the monopolistic wage levels .
If the government and other non-profit institutions are to com-
pensate for the less than optimal allocation of private resources to
production of OSH and of information about OSH, how shall the government
allocation of resources be determined and how shall the government pro-
duce incentives to encourage efficient use of resources? Some of these
problems have been widely studied in more general terms in the literature .
For some classic examples see R .R . Nelson "The Simple Economics of Basic
Scientific Research" ( 33] ; C .J . Hitch "The Character of Research and
Development in a Competitive Economy" ( 211 ; for more recent theoretical
and empirical work especially dedicated to OSH problems, see for instance
the work of T .C . Sinclair, P . Mastrand and P . Newick "Human Life and
Safety in Relation to Technical Change" [471 . A further discussion of possible
government role in promoting production of OSH and of information about
OSH is contained in Section V .
V . THE ROLE OF GOVERN2A=
Objectives of OSH Policy
Government intervention in the OSH area has several (interrelated)
objectives . One is to contribute to increase OSH levels where there is
reason to believe that market imperfections are bringing about OSH levels
which are less than optimal . Particular cases where competitive market
failures
	
may occur in the OSH area were discussed in Section IV .
A second objective is to help determine possible tradeoffs between
more OSH and other social goals, as discussed in Section II, and,
.implicitly, socially desirable overall OSH levels .
A third objective is to help bring about socially desirable distri-
bution of OSH risk . This third objective relates to the first because
it is concerned with Pareto optimal distributions ; however, this objec
tive includes also considerations of equity . This was discussed in
Section III .
/ A fourth objective is to assure that the allocation of government
expenditures (taxpayers contributions), while in accordance with the
above goals, is done efficiently, as discussed in Section II .
The difficulty of analysing government roles is that these different
objectives are interrelated to the-extent that a policy addressed to
each one is likely to affect also the others . Therefore, for analytical
purposes, they have to be studied together even though the effect of
policy on each should be analyzed separately .
Another difficulty is that there may be tradeoffs between the
government objectives and the ranking among them may not always be
understood or well determined . Since government is not a monolithic
unit, perhaps this is the way it should be .
Analysis of a policy should therefore contain whenever possible the
tradeoffs between these goals in order to clarify possible choices to be
made . If this is not explicitly done, an implicit value judgement may
have been made that could bias the discussion,
	
for example, by pre-
ferring a policy which implies a more efficient use of resources to another
which may be less efficient in the short run but prevent high irrever-
sible OSH losses in a more immediate way . A certain amount of subjective
judgement cannot be avoided, but it may be preferable to make it as
explicit as possible .
Until the OSH Act of 1970, occupational safety and health regulation
was mostly the responsibility of the states ;
24
at present OSH
regulation is primarily the responsibility of OSHA . The states can
submit plans to OSHA to run their programs, and OSHA is required to
approve them if they are as stringent as federal programs . On the
other hand states receive only 50% federal financing and OSHA 100%,
which gives ,an incentive for more centralized federal action . Even
though there are reasons why states regulation could be preferrable,
24 There were some exceptions, such as the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Act of 1927 that assigned federal regulatory powers for
longshorement job safety, to the Bureau of Labor Standards of the U .S .
Department of Labor--now in charge of OSHA, see [19 l .
for instance, the standards could be set in a more decentralized manner
and thus would reflect local conditions and needs more precisely and
economically, Congress intended that OSH control be a federal activity .
See for instance the report in (19 ] .
One reason why federal regulation may be preferrable is because it may
avoid possible competition by states for investment and location of
industries at the cost of OSH . For instance, a state may have an
incentive to offer lowered costs of OSH in order to attract new plants
especially to the areas in which there are higher unemployment rates or
lower growth rates . If there are reasons to suspect that in those
cases is where market failures (say, lack of mobility of workers, or
other institutional rigidities) may exist, then a federal role may be
preferable .
In the following analysis, then, we assume that the government
role is carried through federal controls . We discuss the following
instruments : incentives, which include liability laws and taxes ;
standards ; and provision of information .
	
To the extent that these
instruments are complementary in helping to promote OSH for efficient
administration of OSH control, it is of importance to detect in which
cases each may be most useful with respect to the alternatives . The
best form of use of each instrument, or the best achievement of
control by use of a combination of these different instruments can
then be studied . Since we proposed four complementary objectives for
government intervention in OSH, the contribution to each of these
goals should also be clazified . The material of this
section is then to be used to prepare the ground for the classification
of OSH risks for the determination of appropriate government roles
given in Section VII .
INSTRUMENTS
Incentives
Incentives can be viewed as financial penalties that are imposed
on employers when OSH damages (i .e . injuries, illnesses, loss of life) occur .
Workmen's Compensation
Workmen's compensation laws can be a form of incentive to increase
OSH--since, for instance, the firm experiences higher costs if its total bill
for post-injury compensations increases . This incentive role is one of the
objectives listed by the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws for a Workman's Compensation Program ([301, [311) . However,
at present, the incentive role of workmen compensation laws is questionable
due to the quite strong limitations existing on compensations and to the
fact that most firms purchase insurance against the event of workers compensation .
Nevertheless, workmen's compensation should be regarded as a major component
of a government strategy for dealing with OSH, since related laws are in force
at both state and federal level and several recent legislative proposals for ex-
tension of its functions, coverage and compensation limit, are being contemplated .
Other goals of the Workmen Compensation Act as viewed by the
National Commission of State Workmen's Compensation Laws are income
security and provision of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation
services, and broad coverage of employees for OSH losses .
This covers two of the objectives for government intervention in
in the OSH area stated at the beginning of this section, and leaves
aside questions of efficiency and of determination of tradeoffs with
social goals other than OSH . These two latter questions, however, are
seldom considered explicitly as government roles in each form of control
endorsed but need to be discussed when the policy and its best uses are
considered . The possible role of workmen's compensation law as dis-
tributing risks through an insurance mechanism is also not explicitly
mentioned in [31) (it is implicitly considered in the clause about income
security) and needs particular consideration .
Workmen's compensation laws were intended to avoid the costs and
other disadvantages to workers (such as strong 'burden of proof' re-
quirements) and other significant difficulties of implementation of the
laws that have as an only claim for liability the negligence of the
employer . These latter laws, the so-called 'tort laws', were
almost solely the ones in practice until the beginning of this century .
In theory tort laws could provide better incentives than workmen's fines to pre-
vent OSH losses . In fact, in [72] Zeckhauser and Nichols
mention
	
that the legal duties and threat of liabilities implied by
such laws Ore very close to the responsibilities that motivate OSHA
and what might be regarded as the proper incentives for the firm.
However, the existence of compulsory workmen's compensation conflicts
legally with the use of tort laws since legally the first one then
becomes the exclusive resource of the worker [ 7 ] .
Worlamens' statutory compensation is easier to obtain, since it is
of the form of 'no fault' insurance and thus requires much less in-
formational and legal costs to be undertaken by the worker . However, the
settlements are smaller (low maximum payments) and in fact, quite
restrictive . In 1976 it is reported that the actual rate of replacement
of foregone earnings was between 10 and 40 percent . The National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws estimates that overall
in 1972 the median percentage average of wage loss replacement was
40-44% . In addition, as reported in Ashford [ 7 ], the estimates of
worker earnings are understated . Other limitations also exist . The
benefits for permanently disabled workers are often limited in duration
or amount of money, also no consideration is taken for inflation which
OLt 10% price rises per year) could erode rapidly the compensation of
long term disabilities .
There are also examples of the limitations of liability under
common law with respect to a prticular hazard . The Price-Anderson
act, for example, limits the liability of power companies with respect
to the damages arising from an accident at a nuclear power facility .
The tradeoff between tort laws and workmen's compensation com-
bines elements of distribution of income and risk . This is because of
two reasons .
	
One is that statutory compensation involves lesser but
surer settlement ; common law has an uncertain chance of a larger
compensation . The other is that the ability of low income groups to
use successfully the more complex legal procedures is smaller . See,
for instance, the evidence in the work of J . Auerbach
[ 8 ] .
	
However, for efficiency reasons this tradeoff should be left
to the worker who is better able to assess the probabilities and returns
involved--while under present laws, workmen's compensation is sometimes
compulsory and prevents the use of common law liability.
To the extent that workmen's compensation can be extended to
better fulfill its objective of income security for OSH losses, it
could have an important role as spreading risks as well as to equalize
income of workers . However, as noticed above, in the present forms,
such function is quite limited because of the inadequate limitations on
compensation . This could in principle be corrected if these limitations
were less severe ; this, in fact, is the nature of several recent
legislative proposals .
Interestingly, representatives on the insurers business community,
such as the American Insurance Association, and Mutual Insurance
Alliance are opposed to the relaxation of such limitations, see [ 7 ],
chapter 8 .. This would seem at first sight to go against the insurance
industry interest in increasing its revenues, selling more insurance, or
at higher premiums .
It is of interest to discuss this point because it links with the
arguments about imperfections in insurance markets made in Section IV,
and also exposes a connection between two instruments of government
control, the provision of information and of incentives in relation to
workmen's compensation .
The argument is as follows : As presently existing, the legal
limitations on workers compensation d iminishes the cost of insurers to
control for OSH preventive actions by the fines . The lack of control
of firms' actions by insurers was shown in Section IV to lead to two
major (related) problems in insurance markets : moral hazard and
adverse selection . As we showed, the market imperfections were
significant enough that under sufficient risk and lack of information
conditions, no market equilibrium would exist with positive values of
exchange . For the insurance industry, this may mean no business for
certain high risk/low information categories . Therefore, if the firms
liabilities are constrained by law, the market for insurance may be
quite enlarged, with the accompanying benefits to the insurance
industry . The alternative way in which those markets could be secured
by the insurers would be to incur in large informational costs about
the firms' actions . Therefore, the restrictions on workmens compensation
save informational costs that the insurers would have to undertake in
order to keep the market for insurance in OSH compensation which now
exists .
Similarly, from the point of view of the fines, the severe limita-
tions on workmens compensation has an important role in spreading and
reducing their risk . Not only the employee's loss of his/her common
law right limits risks to the employer, but also insurance is available
in these conditions that would not exist otherwise .
An added negative factor of this situation is that because of
those limitations employers may now be overinsured and this, as shown by
the discussion in Section IV, may lead to a negative effect on OSH
expenditures due to a loss of incentive .
As seen by Ashford, for instance, this spreading reduction on risk
for firms may be the single most effective achievement of workmen's
compensation [ 7 J . It should be noticed however that this reduction of
the firm's risks may not only have negative effects such as transfers of
costs away from firms and insurers and to the rest of the population
(through higher OSH costs, higher medical costs, social welfare transfers
and the corresponding taxes) but also some positive effects such as
increased production . For instance as in the price-Anderson act that limits
liability
	
of nuclear plants, reduction of uncertainty and risk
costs for fines is a form of financial encouragement to these firms through
decreased costs and increased revenues . However, such financial incentives
have allocation effects that may decrease Pareto efficiency in a competi-
tive market system . For example, it encourages more those firms with
higher OSH risks . To the extent that such policies are made with an
overall welfare gain in mind (welfare, for instance, being measured
by consumer surplus plus fines revenues) they may have
positive effects . Some risky technologies may be more productive . However,
without a full disclosure of the effects of such policy, social choices,
biased tradeoffs with other goals, and efficiency consideration are not
optimally made . For instance it may be preferrable to give the same
financial incentives to firms that are risky but whose risk may be less costly in
terms of OSH damage . Firths engaged in the production and dissemination of
information about OSH hazards and of productivity increasing techniques
that improve OSH would be of that type, since research and development
is usually risky .
At any rate, the role of government in improving information about
OSH and monitoring firms could decrease the extent to which the increase
of risk spreading ability of workmens' compensation (e .g . higher fines,
less limitations on compensation)is a zero sum game between workers on ; .
one side and firms (and insurers) on the other .
In sum, a coordination of the informational role of government
(about OSH and about firms' actions) with the legislative role of
government, may increase the effectiveness of both roles . As in the above dis-
cussed case, the expenditures used by the government in the role of a provider of
information should not necessarily be regarded as being taken away from
costs allocated to other government roles, such as spreading risks and
providing income security . Because in some cases higher costs on '
information activities will lower the costs of others . In the name of efficiency
such cost externalities across policies should be taken into consideration .
As we shall discuss later, a similar crossed cost effect may exist
with respect to other financial incentives (such as taxes) and standards .
The above arguments are not as valid in the case of small firms . For
instance, for those firms, the adequate collection of information about
firms' actions by the government or other agents, especially as related
to experience rating, is not feasible in general . Also, because of the
relative advantage of increasing returns, large firms are in a much
better condition to absorb OSH costs than smaller ones . In fact, the
possible negative effects of OSH regulations on small fines bnd related
negative effects on income distribution) has been taken into account in
OSH Act, as discussed in Section IV . In order not to diminish incentives
to improve OSH levels for those firms, however, a carefully chosen
co-insurance system for small firms could be established . The problem
is a second-best exercise, as discussed in Section IV .
Even if a more comprehensive system of compensation was legislated
there are certain intrinsic limitations of the workmen's compensation
system that make other forms of regulation preferrable . One is derived
from the fact that in order to insure efficiency for its goals, the
level of compensation required may be different.
	
For instance, for the
goal of achieving proper incentives, the statistical frequency of the da-
mage is the relevant information . For the role of achieving income
security or financial risk spreading, the severity of the financial
loss is the relevant information--these two criteria may not mix well
in certain cases . For example, see the discussion in (19 ] .
Another limitation is that there may be tradeoffs between the posi-
tive distributional effects on financial risks obtained by workmen's
compensation and other market forces of risk distribution, such as that
of wage differentials .
	
Higher compensations may lead to a lowering of
risks premiums in the labor market .
Finally, workmen's compensation is not as appropriate when there
are health damages as with safety losses . In particular, the prevention
value of workmen's compensation may be greatly decreased, for instance,
for illnesses with long latent periods of so-called multiple etiologies .
The causes of accidents are often relatively easier to ascertain
than the causes of loss of health--and also easier to relate to a parti-
cular firm. But diseases may be caused by many different conditions,
or, cumulatively, at several different workplaces . This has the effect
of making workmen's compensation (or taxation) less preferable to other
forms of prevention, such as standards . In some cases, it would make it
less preferable to common law liability also . In those cases, the
above described government role in providing information about firms'
actions may be less useful than the role of government in providing
incentives for more research to be used in the setting and monitoring of
standards .
There is another reason for which, in the case of health, work-
men's compensation (and also taxation) may be less preferable than the
promulgation and monitoring of standards . It arises from timing
considerations . Health losses usually take a longer period to become
apparent . Some of these losses can take up to twenty years or so, as
in the case of vinyl chloride . Even if the fines for compensation or
taxation would be very high, the present managers of the firm may have
very high discount rates which would diminish the impact of those costs
as incentives for prevention . This may happen for instance if the life
of the firm is not expected to be that long, or if the firm does not
plan with a 20 year horizon . Another, perhaps more immediate, reason,
but related to the above, is that the manager him or herself may not
expect to be with the firm for the period of time that it takes for the
health loss to be found .
Government action is not likely to alter such discount rates . For
the above reasons, it would seem that for decreasing health damages
regulation in the form of standards and monitoring may be preferable .
Taxation
Taxation schemes are another incentive for the firm to reduce OSH
losses . The incentive given is efficient when the taxes force firms to
internalize the costs which are borne by society as a whole and not
perceived by the firm, such as those externalities discussed in Section
IV .
Taxation, however, differs from the workmen's compensation in
that the transfers
	
are made to the government rather than to the
workers . Thus, the efficiency of, this method depends in part on the
use of the government funds thereafter--while in the case of workmen's
compensation the worker decides his or her optimal allocation of the
compensation .
In the control of other forms of negative externalities produced
by firms, such as pollution, taxes have been studied and are usually
referred to as effluent charges . The problem of taxation for the
internalization of externalities has been studied quite extensively in economics .
See, for instance, Baumcil (91, Baumol and Oates (101, (111, Coase (181 .
A tax to fines proportional to the OSH losses it causes has been
suggested in [521 and has several advantages . We have discussed this
in some detail in Section IV .
About the possible disadvantages of taxes, they have several elements in
common with respect to workmen's compensation ; we refer to the discussion of
above . While the questions of insurance and information arising with
workmen's compensation do not appear here for taxation, the restrictions
on the efficiency and distributional characteristics of taxation to health
losses (as opposed to safety losses) are all pertinent . Also, with respect to
small firms,
	
analogous problems arise with taxation as with the case
of workmen's compensation .
Taxes could be very efficient if enough information is available .
For example, for frequent safety losses, or losses whose probability of in-
cidence may be small but are well understood, and where the effect of the
firm on the worker's OSH loss is relatively easy to establish, taxes seem
preferable to workmen's compensation, since they produce less transaction
costs than going through a court system .
However for more 'unusual' cases, for which there is less informa-
tion or else the evidence is more difficult to establish workmen's
compensation or common law seem preferable .
To the extent that the government can provide more information,
there would be less cases in which workmen's compensation or common law
may be needed, and taxation could be used, with the corresponding
savings in transaction costs . This would be another instance where the
government role as a provider of information may decrease costs of other
government enforcement activity, and shift the level of efficient
utilization of different policies .
The use of taxes and other forms of incentives require more study .
Also, there is some resistance among policy makers about their use .
Because of the above discussion about the cases in which taxation or
workmen's compensation may not be a good policy instrument, much of that
resistance, especially for health damages, seems justified . In addition,
there are other cases when standards seem preferable to incentives . We
discuss in more detail appropriate combinations of incentive/standard
combinations in the following section .
Standards
Standards are likely to be preferrable to other forms of regulation
in some cases . For instance, if there is a high degree of
uncertainty,standards may be a way to attempt to avoid catastrophic
mistakes while gathering more information to reduce the amount of
uncertainty . Postponing decisions, or else avoiding making irreversible
or extremely costly decisions is a rational way to proceed when infor-
mation is very bad . For the same reason, standards are also a better
way to deal with actions that have a large irreversible component, even
if the probabilities are known and uncertainty is not very high. For
example,in cases of serious illness or death of workers . Incentives
which produce a cost to the firm after the fact are more interchangable
with strong measures of prevention,
	
the smaller the costs and the
larger is the reversibility of the event, for instance, if monetary
compensation can undo the damage to an extent .
This point has been recently put forth by the present Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, Dr . Evla Bingham
( 46] in an answer to the position of C . Schultze, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers . Schultze would prefer incentives over
standards . In Dr . Binghms' words : "the idea of using worker's bodies
to drive the wheel is a philosophy untenable to me . I am in the business
of preventing sickness and injury, not using bodies to drive up the
cost so that business will find it more profitable to comply ."
This point can actually be formalized in a manner similar to the
study of other problems of regulation when costs and benefits are un-
certain . Rules that apply to very uncertain situations as explained
above will also be applicable for very irreversible situations .
In economic terms an incentive such as a tax can be thought of as
'price' reward (or punishment) schedule . Standards are quantity con-
trols . Problems of optimal rewards, i .e . the rewards that the regulator
transmits to a firm to elicit an optimal response,have been studied
quite extensively . The.arguments in favor of price regulation (taxa-
tion) used to be more favored by economists .
	
At present, problems of
optimal reward or regulations under uncertainty are studied, there are
many arguments in favor of quantity regulations (standards) . More
recent work such as [69 ] and [7p.] sponsor price/quantity regulation .
The degree of uncertainty influences the optimal combination of price
rewards Ctaxation) and quantity controls (standards) .
While the benefits obtained by the rewards- schedule depend on the
output of all the firms, the reward function must influence the
action of the individual firm . 'Price' rewards are taken to be linear
functions of output . 'Quantities' controls are penalty functions of
deviation from targets, for instance, quadratic loss functions . The analysis
of what are optimal taxation/standard combinations can be done following
the . work . of Weitzman [6-9) .
Let there be n commodities, and denote by xi the units of
commodity i produced by the i-th firm.
	
x = (xl , . . ., xn) either re-
presents different goods (i .e . each firm produces a different good,
or the same item produced by different production units) . OSH produc-
tion would be one of these commodities--its negative would represent OSH
losses . The cost function of firm i is written as
where E,
i
is a disturbance term, a stochastic element representing the
uncertainty about the events (including OSH losses) in different states
of the world . As viewed by the regulator, OSH events have a prior
distribution, and this is the distribution of the random variable E
i
, .
The benefit function depends also on an uncertain random variable S,
whose probability distribution is estimated also by the regulator as a
prior, i .e .
B - B(x,S) .
Ci is assumed to be strictly convex in xi for each Ei, and B strictly
convex in x,for each S . A response function relates the amount of
output produced x,
1
to the state E ., i .e . it is a function g
1,(E1.)1
The expected social return over all response functions {gi ( " )} is
n
T({gi (
. )}) E [B({gi(Ei)} ;d) - ci(gi(ei) ;Ei)J
E: 1,6 i=1
A reward or regulatory function Ri (xi ) is a schedule of monetary payments
received by firm i as a function of its output (for instance its OSH
output) . If the regulatory function is in a form of taxation incentive
that yields a price pi to be paid for the output of firm i, the
regulation function is :
R .
i
(x
i
. )
	
- p
ix .i
If x.,
i
is a standard or quota on the amount to be produced
Ri (xi ) _ - 2i (xi - X 2l)
By the process of profit maximization each regulatory function generates
an output response . For a given R .( .) and £ . the firm i will attempt to
i i
solve the problem
max R . (x,) - c . (x, : E . )
x .>0 1 1 I i. i
I-
The solution is some response function
gi ( Ei) = Gi (Ri ( " ) 'e i)
satisfying for all E . the condition
i
R
1
.(G
1
.(R
1.( " ),E .)) - c1.(G1.(R1.( " ),e1" ) ;E 1
.) = max R .(x .) - c .(x .~E .)~ 1 1 1 ~ 1
x>O
Through the output function they induce, regulatory functions yield
an expected value of the difference between benefits and costs
(1) ~( {Ri ( " ) }) E ~ ( {G i (Ri ( " ) . " ) })
where the {qi } satisfy
n
8
	
1(3)	Ski ~l + n . _
- Yi
= . . . n
j=l qj + Yj 1 qi + Yi
In the above expression (3) 6 ij is a parameter defined by the conditional
expectation of e, given e,, and the n, by the expected value of d
conditional on e
i
. . The S ij.,
are derived from the marginal benefit of
commodity i, which is assumed to be of the form :
B l (x,d) = p -
1 j 71
(x - x ) + ai i=1, . . . , n=1 J j
Finally, the d i are derived from the marginal cost function of the i-th
producer which is assumed to be of the form
C'(x
i
se ) = p, + Y,(x, - x,) + e,, n
An optimal regulation {R *( " )}) is a function that maximizes (1), i .e .
i
that satisfies
In Weitzman ( I it is proven that under certain regularity
assumptions and assumptions on the conditional probabilities, optimal
regulation can be expressed in the form
(2) Ri*(xi ) = pixi - qi (xi - xi) 2 + constant .
2
To firm i, this regulatory function means : if output xi is produced
the firm receive p dollars per unit of output, aside from the arbitraryi
constant . For each units more or less 25
25Of course, the penalty functions need not be symmetric functions of the
deviation from the target . Undershooting the target (OSH level) would
have much higher penalties than overshooting it . "'
produced, the payment per unit goes down by qi/2 dollars . The properties
of an optimal regulation can be derived from equation (2) which is
the analytical expression for the optimal regulation . The first term
of (2)
(4) pixi
is the price regulation (e .g . taxation) . if pi would represent accurately
the marginal benefit of commodity i, using (4) as a regulation (i .e .
taxation) would induce the firm i to produce that amount of OSH where
marginal benefit equals marginal cost . This idea is what makes taxation
so attractive to many economists . However, as Weitzman points out, the
marginal benefit of commodity i cannot be reduced to a single number
pi that is known in advance .
	
The term in the second part of expression (2)
(5) - qi (xi - xi) 2
2
is a quadratic penalty for deviation from the target value xi (the
standard) . if xi would be the socially optimum output (say, of OSH),
and if the government would have (5) as a regulatory function, it would
apparently be able to direct the firm to produce the social optimum
amount of OSH .' However, rarely it is known which is the optimum social
level xi in advance .
The optimal regulatory function in (2) contains both a taxation
and a standard. According to these results, one can find out in what
cases it is preferrable to emphasize standards .
If marginal benefits decrease rapidly around the optimal quota
there is a high degree of risk aversion and the regulatory authority
cannot afford being even slightly off the mark, relying on prices is
too risky ;
	
a miscalculation will have detrimental circumstances . In
such a situation, the weight of the quantity (or standard) term (5)
becomes higher in (2), the q
i 's are larger . For a proof, see (69 ) .
In such situations one should put more emphasis on the standard as
the regulatory force ; it provides a rigid output controllability which
is preferrable under the conditions . Examples of such OSH hazards where
standards are preferrable would be those with very high costs (deaths),
or very high uncertainty and relatively high costs (unknown health .
effects that could be very serious) . However, the weight of the second
term (5) in (2),' (derived from the values of the qi 's) is lessened when
benefits are close to being linear . In such cases, when the uncertainties
are not very large, and the costs of deviating from the target rela-
tively smaller, expected marginal social benefit is approximately con-
stant over some range, then the superior policy is the one where the
price term (4) (taxation) dominates, for instance, those OSH hazards
which have relatively little uncertainty and whose social costs are
relatively lower (e .g . stair cases, bathroom regulations) .
Provision of Information
The importance of the government role in providing information to
all agents making OSH decisions has been underlined many times in the
above discussions .
The problem can be divided into two categories : the generation or
production of information, and the dissemination or distribution of
information .
Since this study does not attempt to deal with the regulatory pro-
blem in operational terms, but rather to raise analytical issues that
may be of use for regulatory strategy, we shall not offer here specific
policy guidelines .
One point that was stressed in several parts in this work
was that the production and dissemination of information may in many
cases be complementary rather than competitive with other policies in
terms of use of resources
	
because expenditures allocated to informa-
tional activities could decrease the costs (or improve the outcome) of
other regulatory activities . In this section, for instance, we
discussed the possible government role to provide information to in-
surers in order to make feasible the extension of workmen's compensa-
tion beyond the present restrictive limits . This information consisted
not only, for instance, of knowledge about effects of new chemicals or
techniques but also in better knowledge about firms' actions, such as
experience of injuries, or present OSH cost for prevention . In that
second sense, the gathering of information may help to decentralize in
some cases the gathering of information (by relying on workers'
monitoring, for instance) . In other cases, the role of distribution
of risk can be decentralized in more efficient ways across society
(through private insurers) while allowing for adequate forms of
compensation for workers . This was discussed in detail in the last
part of Section III, in Section IV in the part on markets with imper-
fect information, and in this Section in the part on workmen's compen-
sation.
A similar informational role could be played by the government to
help to substitute more costly court action by standardized injury-taxes
(or in general OSH taxes) . This was discussed in this Section both in
the part about workmen's compensation and also in the part about
taxation . Finally, the discussion on OSH externalities and externalities
on the production of information about OSH in Section IV underlines
the crucial role of government in this issue . As with other forms of
research and development, the government has an important role : to
share the uncertainties of such forms of production so that socially optimal
levels of production take place . The U .S . government's role as a
provider of incentives to decrease uncertainties and increase production
is clear in cases such as the Price-Anderson act, that diminishes the
risks to nuclear power plants . A similar but more OSH
oriented government attitude is called for in the production of OSH and
of information about OSH . There is also a government role for encourag-
ing more decentralized work in the area of production of OSH information--
for instance, by encouraging private foundations .
(liability)
Of course, the provision of OSH information to workers and to labor
unions may also help to obtain further decentralization in decision
making . This is discussed in more detail in the next Section .
VI . THE ROLE OF LABOR UNIONS
Labor unions are one of the main institutions for conveying workers'
preferences and demands to management .
Even though empirical results (e .g . Thaler and Rosen (58 ] and
Viscusi [68 ]) suggest that workers in risky occupations are able to
command higher wage premiums for risks if they are unionized, historically,
labor unions have not fared very well in the OSH area . In the following
we discuss a possible rationale for the behavior of labor unions of not
emphasizing health and safety in collective bargaining .
It should be noted, however, that unionized workers represent less
than 25% of all workers in the U .S . Better conditions for unionized
workers may in some cases improve the conditions of non-unionized
workers as well, by,improving their bargaining position with respect
to OSH, as higher salaries of unionized workers may improve those of
non-unionized workers in some cases . However, in other cases, the
effect may be just the opposite . This requires careful case by case
empirical examination . The role of government to improve the OSH levels of
non-unionized workers may be in those latter cases, most important .
There are some difficulties involved in collective bargaining when
there is more than one item on the agenda. This is because in these cases
problems arise for adequately representing different individual preferences
by collective ones . For example, if the individual utility functions of workers
depend, for each level of leisure, only on wages, i .e . u = u(w), since
all utilities are increasing in wages, any increasing function of w, W(w)
would be an adequate collective welfare function for
	
workers to be used
by their representative in the bargaining process . When individuals have
different preferences and there are more than two items in the agenda,
the problem becomes more difficult . Such aggregation of preferences
when more than one item is on the agenda are especially difficult when
one of the items may be related to the other, and in an opposite direction
in some cases . For instance, the desirability of higher wages is
derived from the utility of income. To the extent that more OSH may
increase labor costs, decrease demand for labor and thereby decrease
income (as discussed in Sections II and IV), more OSH may imply less
income . Therefore, wages and OSH may, in those cases be related, and affect
the utility of workers in opposite directions .
More formally, assume that the following principles or axioms are
to be satisfied by the aggregation of individual into collective pre-
ferences or welfare functions .
(1) Anonymity : the order in which individuals are considered (i .e .
the order of voting if the aggregation is determined by a voting
procedure) should not change the outcome . This can also be
understood as a basic rule of equality of representation .
(2) Pareto condition : if all prefer outcome a to b, the collective
welfare function does too, i .e . W(a) > W(b)
(3)
	
Reliability on some polling processes, i .e . that if there is
imperfect information, after a certain amount of information is col-
lected, say, by a poll, the outcome can be relied on to be approximately
accurate .
This condition can be seen to be, at a technical level, one of
continuity of the map that aggregates individual preferences into
collective ones
(ul , . . . , un ) -> W
where there are n workers . Then, for instance, if W = u1 + . . . + un
then W(w) satisfies properties (1) (2) and (3) if all individual
utilities are increasing functions of one variable, wages .
However, when there are more than two items on the agenda, for
instance, when the utilities of workers depend on wages and OSH levels,
and, in addition, when there is imperfect information about OSH Prefer
ences, (so that for instance intensities of preferences between
any two alternatives may not be known) there may be no rule of aggregation
of workers' preferences into collective ones satisfying the conditions
(1) (2) and 0) . This was proven in Chichilnisky ( 161 . Problems of
impossibility of aggregation into collective rules have been studied
extensively since the classical work of Arrow (4 1 and Black. .
This then represents an obstacle for labor union representatives
in satisfactorily representing the membership preferences when wages and
safety are both on the agenda. To avoid these problems, a simpler agenda
with just one item, wages, may be preferred in many cases by the repre-
sentative, since these are less informational problems about preferences
on wages than on OSH .
There are other reasons why, even if a dual agenda (on wages and OSH)
is chosen, union representatives may lean towards seeking (bargaining for)
higher wages and deemphasize OSH . They also relate to information
problems .
	
(1) The lack of information or uncertainty about health
hazards by the workers, and thus their possible lower average valuation
of OSH improvements obtained by the union may undermine the value of
bargaining for them in the eyes of the representative . This is asso-
ciated to (2) the costs and difficulties for the union representatives
to obtain information about health hazards in the industry--and to
disseminate it to the membership--versus no costs with respect to wages .
Therefore a wage gain by the representative requires less costs to be
appreciated by the membership than an OSH gain .
Many of the arguments presented above are derived from the lack of
availability of information about OSH and about firms' actions about
OSH, and from the costs of obtaining information .
More recently, as of 1966, the National Labor Relations Board has
established the principle that OSH be mandatory items in the bargaining
agenda .
In Ashford [ 7 ], Chapter 10, it is reported that the present trend
is towards contract bargaining as the union mechanism for improving
OSH conditions . This may be related to the current awareness and in-
creased information about OSH problems referred to above . This was
reported from the Proceedings of
the Conference on occupational Health and Safety at the Jack Tar Hotel,
San Francisco, California, November 1973 sponsored by the California
Labor Federation, AFL-CIO and the Center of Labor Research and Edu-
cation, University of California, Berkeley . The unions are working to
adopt,OSH clauses in the collective bargaining agreements in the
following areas : funding for production of OSH information on a
country wide basis, expanded protection, methods to expedite arbitra-
tion, union inspection rights, use of impartial experts, training of
union OSH stewards to control enforcement of standards, screening tests
for employees to identify health hazards, OSH committees to conduct
inspections and to set policy . Many of those items are still to be
incorporated in the bargaining agenda . If adopted they would improve
greatly the efficiency of unions in bargaining for better wages and OSH
conditions . Some of the problems presented above for union bargaining
about OSH would then be resolved .
As seen from the above, the role of government could be extremely
important, especially in the provision of the information implicit in
the above areas . Such policies of the government would help to bring
about more efficiency in the setting of OSH levels by collective
bargaining processes, at least for unionized workers . Some of the costs
of monitoring OSH and disseminating information could be undertaken by
the unions, in a more decentralized way, as suggested by the above
clauses .
	
This would be another way that the provision of information
by the government may be complementary to other regulatory activities,
and also decrease other regulatory costs .
VII . CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper analyzed some problems of labor market adjustments to
OSH hazards, and presented some analytical models for the eventual
measurement and empirical analysis of factors affecting the levels of OSH .
The work has not attempted to deal with regulatory problems in operational
terms : the purpose was to raise conceptual issues that may be relevant
for regulatory strategy .
The question of appropriate OSH levels was seen to relate with
issues of efficiency and social equity in the distribution of risks, and
also with tradeoffs with other possibly competing objectives (such as
employment and other government programs) .
	
In order to clarify alter-
natives and to help make policy choices, a cost-efficiency criterion was
proposed as useful to analyze, in particular, choices among expenditures
in different standards, and across activities and classes of workers .
Efficiency was also seen to be an important mediating factor in deciding
the severity of tradeoffs and thereby the feasibility of policies
addressed to improving risk distributions in society (without hindering
distribution of income and of other goods) .
Market imperfections in the decentralized determination of OSH
levels and risk premiums were analyzed . Problems of lack of information
or of asymmetric information about OSH and about firms' actions about
OSH were studied, as well as OSH externalities and also externalities
in the production of OSH and information about OSH .
The role of the government was discussed in the light of objective
and alternative instruments of policy .
The role of labor unions was analyzed, both with respect to the
historical characteristic of not emphasizing OSH, and with respect to the
more recent trend to bring OSH issues as part of contract bargaining .
In the light of this analysis, the diverse characteristics of OSH
problems were shown to call for a variety of policies . A classification
of OSH cases and of corresponding adequate policies appeared as an
important component of a cost efficient policy for the improvement of OSH
levels and their distribution . The brief discussion that follows is
not to be viewed as policy recommendations, but rather as an aid in
clarifying some of the conceptual issues involved, and analyzing
regulatory strategy .
A common component of many OSH hazards is that the OSH losses
(death, injuries, illnesses) are experienced by one group (the workers,
their families and communities) while many decisions about OSH (and
accompanying costs) such as prevention, development of safer techniques
or substances, production and dissemination of information about
OSH, are made by firms . This characteristic is, for instance, is what
Smith [ 521
	
refers to when he calls firms the 'middlemen' between
production and consumption of OSH .
In economic terms, the firms in those cases are agents for the
workers much the same way that medical doctors and hospitals have the
role of agents to decide the patient's health care of medical expenditures .
The problem of OSH is complex because the agent's utilities (firms'
OSH costs) may be in contradiction with the workers' utilities (de-
creased OSH losses) .
	
Because of the existence of this agent relations
among other reasons, insurance markets that in general operate to
spread risks do not function appropriately . OSH losses insurance for
workers (adjusted so that premiums would not discriminate against low
income groups, and with coinsurance rates to provide incentives)
could not be expected to solve the optimal risk distribution problem .
One rule is to have the firms internalize the worker's OSH losses and to
provide insurance to firms . Tort laws, workmen's compensation, have this
role of internalizing OSH costs . However it is widely agreed that at present
the fines and compensation to workers are not sufficient to spread risks
adequately, or to provide adequate incentives for firms to prevent OSH losses .
These questions were discussed in some detail in Sections III, IV and V .
To the extent that certain hazards are well understood, are not so
irreversible and of such a nature that money compensation is
appropriate, a system of incentives in the form of taxation to firms
seems preferable to workmen's compensation and tort laws to force fines
to internalize OSH losses for reasons of efficiency . The OSH losses in
this case should have relatively known risks (probability distributions
of occurence), the consequences should be more or less well established,
and in addition the association of the losses with a particular firm
should be relatively easy to establish . Examples are safety hazards
(such as injuries) or some health hazards (such as 'black lung' in some
cases) . When there are some informational problems such as to establish
whether the worker has suffered an injury or an illness, or the firm's (or
firms')identity, workmen's compensation or liability legislation may be
more adequate . Under these conditions, the premiums that the insurer
should demand from the firms should depend on the characteristics of the
firm as well as on the firm's actions . For large, longer lived firms
comprehensive experience records should be kept to help in determining
the firm's actions by past experiences of OSH losses . Here the informa-
tional and monitoring roles of the government may overlap . The government
could help the availability of adequate OSH insurance coverage to firms in
several ways . One would be to monitor firm's actions effectively, con-
veying to the insurance information about firm's actions (see the
discussion of Sections IV and V) .
	
Another way would be to legislate
that comprehensive records about OSH be filed each year by firms,
much the same way that records on income are filed and with similar
penalties for misrepresentation of facts . Another way still would be
to engage workers and labor unions in helping to decrease government
monitoring costs by encouraging by better reporting of OSH losses and of
firm's actions, much the same way that employers report on workers'
income . This could also serve the function of gathering and disseminat-
ing information to workers and unions about OSH and OSH actions by firms .
For small firms, where experience rating cannot be used to produce
incentives more reliance would be placed on coinsurance rates . These
issues were discussed in Sections V and VI .
In contrast to the above cases, when OSH losses are irreversible or
very costly and not adequately compensated by incurring expenses, or
where uncertainty and social risk aversion is very high, standards seem
preferable to incentives . This type of OSH problem is associated with
life loss, and also with health hazards with high uncertainty and
social risk aversion, or hazards where there may be long periods of pain
and suffering that cannot be alleviated by incurring health expenditures .
This was discussed in Section VI . It should be noticed that for stan-
dards to be effective more emphasis should be put on the targets (lives
saved, illnesses prevented) than on the method for reaching the target .
For efficiency's sake the firms should be able to choose methods that
minimize cost whenever possible . Adequate fines for non-compliance
and adequate inspection are very important : a good incentive system
may be preferable to a bad system of setting and monitoring standards,
even in the cases of these types of OSH losses . Again, in order to
diminish costs, workers and labor unions should be engaged in report-
ing firm's actions whenever possible .
	
See Section VI .
The role of the governemnt in providing information was seen to be
complementary to the role of establishing incentives and/or standards .
There may be some cost savings for both . incentives and standards
policies when there is better information . For example, with better
information some legal costs can be saved since taxation may become
preferable to workmen's compensation or liability laws . Also, the
insurers may be able to provide wider coverage to firms if there is
more OSH information and also information about firms' actions . In
the case of standards, more adequate goals and better compliance rates
may be feasible at lower costs if more is known about certain OSH losses .
For efficiency, the role of producing and disseminating information
about OSH should utilize whenever possible, nongovernment groups and
organizations . For example, labor unions could be effective in
disseminating information and to provide in some cases 'on the site' OSH
monitoring offices ; workers could be of help in producing and monitoring
information about firm's actions . The degree of unionization of an industry
or sector should be taken into account to disclose the needs of OSH regula-
tion for non-unionized workers .
	
Provision of economic incentives to OSH
research and development could be a more decentralized government role in
production of OSH information . Data on the possible spillover effects
of OSH losses on the worker's family and communities, and on the population
as a whole (.through income security and medical programs) would also be an
area of OSH information to be further developed .
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